Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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240 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
rests on implausible <strong>and</strong> avoidable claims about the objects of cognition being<br />
mental items. Berkeley’s arguments for these claims are effectively refuted by<br />
invoking the distinctions drawn earlier (between concepts as id quo <strong>and</strong> as<br />
id quod, <strong>and</strong> between cognitive <strong>and</strong> contiguous presence). But this leaves the<br />
thought, inspired by Berkeley <strong>and</strong> developed by Dummett, that the only way<br />
we can give sense to the anti-Protagorean belief that things are measured not<br />
by us but by the real is to define reality in terms of what is known by God.<br />
While it certainly maintains that the idea of the real is (implicitly) epistemically<br />
constrained, this variety of ‘anti-realism’ is far removed from anything that<br />
would encourage the sorts of ontological relativism, or social constructivism<br />
to which Smart <strong>and</strong> I are opposed.<br />
Moreover, there is perhaps an anticipation of this position in Aquinas. At<br />
the end of my reply to Smart (pp. 189–90) I suggested that God has so<br />
ordered creation that there is a progression from materially embodied forms<br />
(the natures of individual things) to their assimilation in the minds of created<br />
intellects (where they exist as universal concepts). I then added that as this is<br />
achieved we come to be more fully images of the creator, <strong>and</strong> quoted Aquinas<br />
to the effect that while things in nature are expressions of ideas in the mind<br />
of God, ideas in the minds of men are expressions of things in nature.<br />
Aquinas gives another expression of this idea when he writes:<br />
the Divine intellect is the explanation for the nature considered both in itself<br />
<strong>and</strong> as it exists singularly in particular things; <strong>and</strong> the nature considered in itself<br />
<strong>and</strong> in singular things is the explanation for our human underst<strong>and</strong>ing, as in a<br />
certain sense its ‘measure’. 20<br />
In this sense, at least, Mind makes the world in the act of knowing it. Yet<br />
since God’s knowledge of the structure of the world is practical, <strong>and</strong> not<br />
observational or speculative (as is ours), it should properly be said that God<br />
knows the world in making it.<br />
6 The Nature of God<br />
God is the originating <strong>and</strong> sustaining cause of everything other than God;<br />
both of its being <strong>and</strong> of its nature. Considered from a finite perspective this is<br />
an inconceivably vast <strong>and</strong> complex production <strong>and</strong> management responsibility,<br />
<strong>and</strong> it may suggest to some that God’s mind must itself be complex<br />
<strong>and</strong> his activities many <strong>and</strong> multifarious. Yet I claimed that God is perfectly<br />
simple: without parts <strong>and</strong> unchanging. I agree with Smart <strong>and</strong> others that if<br />
God were complex then the order of his mind <strong>and</strong> operations would itself call<br />
for an explanation; however, whereas he sees that as a reductio ad absurdum on