Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

222 J.J. Haldane
atheism and theism. Neither of us count ourselves ‘philosophers of religion’ in
the sense of being specialists in this field; but both of us have similarly wideranging
philosophical positions, with mutual respect for the seriousness of these,
and a lively recognition of their bearing on the fundamental issue of whether
the universe is a creation or a naturally occurring entity. There are, however,
certain differences in approach antecedent to our conclusions about the existence
of God. Smart is concerned primarily with the nature of the cosmos, and
descends from that to the question of the nature of persons; my interests
begin with the personal as a category of being, and I work outwards from that
to the nature of the world and the preconditions of its existence.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that our original exchanges ranged across such
matters as physics, biology, logic, mathematics, and the philosophies of mind,
language, action and value; and it is revealing the extent to which we focused
in different ways and to different degrees on each. It is also significant that
we each look(ed) beyond philosophy for inspiration and direction: Jack Smart
to the achievements of experimental and theoretical science; I to the integration
of existential reflection and abstract theology represented by orthodox
Roman Catholicism. These overlapping and contrasting interests and orientations
give the exchange something of the character of an extended discussion
between engaged philosophical generalists, rather than a narrowly focused
symposium in a meeting of philosophers of religion.
Such breadth of approach, and consideration of a non-specialist readership,
bring advantages in requiring one to keep in view the wood rather than the
trees, and to relate the parts of the scene to the landscape as a whole; but it
is also inclined to be impressionistic where detail is ultimately necessary, and
to be selective in ways that are liable to charges of omission. Such omissions
are likely to be most accutely felt by specialists in philosophy of religion, the
more so given the undoubted fact that, after years of languishing outside
the philosophical mainstream, in the last quarter of the twentieth century the
subject acquired a rigour and status in which its practitioners take proper pride.
This achievement was due largely to pioneering work done by William Alston,
Peter Geach, Anthony Kenny, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne.
Any survey of contemporary philosophy of religion would need to take
note of work by these and other analytical writers, and observe the fact that as
well as bringing great skill to the subject, they re-animated it with new
techniques and approaches, including the development of distinctive theories
of knowledge and modality. In this connection Alvin Plantinga and Richard
Swinburne deserve special mention. The first deployed possible world metaphysics
on behalf of the ontological argument and in defence of theism against
the problem of evil; and then fashioned accounts of basic belief and its
warrant that brought comfort to theists and discomfort to atheists who presumed
that religious belief was intrinsically irrational. Swinburne applied the