Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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136 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
above to show that such a mind is simple, unique, unchanging, <strong>and</strong> so on.<br />
Yet, precisely this addition may seem to create the sort of problem that the<br />
objector envisaged. For if I wish to say that God is unchanging, this raises<br />
the prospect that he is not in time (assuming as many have done that change<br />
<strong>and</strong> time are correlative); <strong>and</strong> if I also want to claim that temporal effects are<br />
due to his agency, I then seem to have advanced a contradiction: that God’s<br />
activity is both inside <strong>and</strong> outside of time. Or it may be supposed that even to<br />
attribute thought to God is to ascribe a temporal <strong>and</strong> complex process incompatible<br />
with his eternity <strong>and</strong> impassibility.<br />
The issue of divine eternity is an intricately structured one <strong>and</strong> for present<br />
purposes I am happy to adopt the view that God is timeless in the sense<br />
(whatever exactly that is) of being ‘outside’ time. How then can he act in it?<br />
I do not think it is an option for the theist to deny divine agency in the world,<br />
not least because I have endorsed the view that the only way to reason to<br />
God’s existence is from his (or here one might better say ‘its’) effects. But the<br />
claim that God produces effects ‘in time’ is ambiguous, since the temporal<br />
reference may either be to God’s effects or to his agency. So far as mundane<br />
action is concerned both the causing <strong>and</strong> the being effected are temporal, but<br />
once again this is not something that is implied by the idea of agency as such.<br />
To hold that A caused B is only to maintain that B is due to A, <strong>and</strong> it is a<br />
further step, therefore, to claim that if B occurred at t then A must also have<br />
occurred at some time t′ (presumably prior to or simultaneous with t). Of<br />
course, someone may reply that such agency as we are familiar with, i.e. our<br />
own, is temporally situated. That, however, is beside the point. For what<br />
would have to be demonstrated is that if the effects of an action are temporal<br />
then so must be the action.<br />
A similar rejoinder is available in response to the claim that thought<br />
involves time <strong>and</strong> complexity. Human thinking takes time <strong>and</strong> makes use<br />
of ‘separate pieces’ – for example as we fashion a chain of reasoning out of<br />
initially unconnected symbols. But it is possible to assign these facts to what<br />
are plausibly contingent features of human mental processes. The defining<br />
characteristics of reasoning, as contrasted with mere psychological activity,<br />
are atemporal features, for example entailment <strong>and</strong> contradiction. Consider<br />
the following elementary modus ponens proof:<br />
If you are reading this then you must be awake<br />
You are reading this<br />
∴ You must be awake<br />
What makes this a valid piece of logic are certain abstract features <strong>and</strong> not<br />
any empirical relations between a series of marks on paper. In acknowledging<br />
this fact we see the need to distinguish between the (logical) content of a