Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 103<br />
through the learning of general terms. Alice is enabled to think cat by being<br />
taught the word ‘cat’ (or an equivalent). On this account, therefore, the<br />
concept is not innate, the child had to be taught it; <strong>and</strong> nor is it abstracted,<br />
she was not able to attend to cats as cats prior to being instructed in the use of<br />
the concept.<br />
Bringing Aquinas into the picture enables one to see how something of<br />
this sort may not just be an alternative to innateness <strong>and</strong> abstractionism but<br />
a via media. In order for something like the Wittgensteinian explanation to<br />
work it has to be the case that the child has a prior predisposition or potentiality<br />
to form concepts under appropriate influences; <strong>and</strong> it also has to be the<br />
case that among these is one that is itself already possessed of the concept.<br />
Alice will not pick up the meaning of the term ‘cat’ unless she has a relevant<br />
potentiality, unless the structure of her receptivity is of the right sort. By the<br />
same token, that potentiality will not be actualized except by an intellect that<br />
is already active in using the concept, her older brother James, for example. This<br />
vocabulary of ‘actuality’ <strong>and</strong> ‘potentiality’ is drawn from the Aristotelian–<br />
Thomistic tradition, as is the less familiar terminology of the mind’s ‘receptivity’<br />
<strong>and</strong> ‘activity’. Aquinas himself speaks of the active <strong>and</strong> passive intellects<br />
as powers of one <strong>and</strong> the same thinker, which raises a question as to whether<br />
he is over-individualistic in his conception of the mind. In any event, here<br />
I am forging a link with Wittgenstein’s linguistic-communitarian account of<br />
the origins of thinking in the individual, <strong>and</strong> that suggests dividing these<br />
aspects of the intellect, at least in the first instance, between the teacher <strong>and</strong><br />
the taught. In these terms one may say that Alice’s intellect is receptive to, or<br />
potentially informed by, the concept cat, while the mind or intellect of James<br />
who has already mastered the use of the term is active with, or actually<br />
informed by this concept. In teaching Alice the word, James imparts the<br />
concept <strong>and</strong> thereby actualizes her potentiality. This picture grants something<br />
both to innatism <strong>and</strong> to abstractionism. On the one h<strong>and</strong>, in order to explain<br />
possession of concepts a native power has to be postulated; but on the other<br />
it is allowed that, in a sense, concepts are acquired through experience.<br />
Notice two features of this explanation. First it seems to give rise to a<br />
regress, <strong>and</strong> second <strong>and</strong> relatedly it instantiates the structure of Aquinas’s<br />
primary proof of the existence of God. He writes:<br />
The first <strong>and</strong> most obvious way is based on change. For certainly some things<br />
are changing: this we plainly see. Now anything changing is being changed by<br />
something else. This is so because what makes things changeable is unrealized<br />
potentiality, but what makes them cause change is their already realized state:<br />
causing change brings into being what was previously only able to be, <strong>and</strong> can<br />
only be done by something which already is. For example, the actual heat of fire<br />
causes wood, able to be hot, to become actually hot, <strong>and</strong> so causes change in the