Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

168 J.J.C. Smart
from within’ in a sense different from that in which neurophysiological events
are thought of by neurophysiological theorists (see p. 145). I am tempted
to close the discussion simply by saying that I do not understand Haldane’s
special ‘moved from within’. I do not really like this neo-Wittgensteinian
ploy. In my younger days it was possible in certain circles to win an argument
by looking at the ceiling and saying in a plonking tone of voice ‘I don’t
understand’, where upon the opponent was supposed to feel a fool for having
said something meaningless. I have a delightful memory of when a brash
young Oxonian tried this on Russell and Russell replied ‘I am not responsible
for your intellectual deficiencies, young man.’ Still, I do have difficulty, whatever
the reason, with Haldane’s account of free action.
Haldane concludes chapter 2 with an important statement of the need to
supplement abstract philosophical theology with the deliverances of revelation.
For my part I am sceptical about whether supposed revelation really is
revelation. See my remarks in my main essay on the argument from religious
experience and on the higher criticism of the New Testament. I am nevertheless
impressed by these final pages: if I agreed with Haldane on the abstract
theology I might indeed be more disposed to accept the additional claims of
revelation. This illustrates the fact that philosophical disputes are not easily
settled even between intelligent and intellectually honest participants. Individual
theses come to some extent as part of a package deal: metaphysics has
a holistic character. Let John Haldane now have the last word!
Notes
1 See two rather horrible articles of mine, ‘Metaphysics, Logic and Theology’ and
‘The Existence of God’, in Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, New Essays in
Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955).
2 See p. 90.
3 D.M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm, Consciousness and Causality: A Debate
on the Nature of Mind (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). Here I am in broad
agreement with Armstrong. I think that indeed Haldane would not be in
much agreement with Malcolm’s approach.
4 Perhaps Newton said this merely to put into theological language his awareness
that he had not proved the stability of the solar system. Perhaps when La Place
replied to Napoleon, à propos of the existence of God, ‘Sire, I have no need of
that hypothesis’, he may have been alluding only to proof of stability. I am no
historian, but it is a nice thought.
5 E.W. Barnes, Scientific Theory and Religion (London: Cambridge University Press,
1933), p. 420.
6 For my views on biology (in which I include psychology) see ch. 4 of J.J.C.
Smart, Our Place in the Universe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).