Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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64 J.J.C. Smart<br />
sent to prison. If our actions were not determined by our desires attempts<br />
at deterrence would be futile.<br />
It is sometimes said that we can act from a sense of duty against our<br />
strongest desire or combination of desires. 105 Such an objector forgets that<br />
sense of duty is itself a desire (to do one’s duty). This is a desire that parents,<br />
teachers, friends, clergy <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>ing officers are keen to inculcate.<br />
(Immanuel Kant distinguished ‘willing’ from ‘desiring’ but this was to make<br />
a metaphysical mystery of something that can be naturalistically explained.)<br />
Another thing that has commonly been said is that libertarian free will<br />
is acting from reasons, not from causes. This does not help. In one sense<br />
a reason is a cause. ‘What was your reason for asking for coffee?’ ‘I just<br />
wanted coffee rather than tea.’ Here the desire for coffee was greater than<br />
that for tea <strong>and</strong> the desire caused the action. On another occasion asking for<br />
a reason may be asking for a justification. ‘Why did you do that?’ ‘I promised<br />
my wife that I’d do it.’ Here there is implicit reference to a rule of promise<br />
keeping. The rule (or ‘reason’ in this sense) is not something that acts on us.<br />
The upshot is that acting from reasons is not something different from <strong>and</strong><br />
possibly in conflict with acting from causes. The justificatory story is perfectly<br />
compatible with the causal story.<br />
Because free will is compatible with determinism God could have set up<br />
the universe so that we always acted rightly, <strong>and</strong> so for this reason alone the<br />
free will defence does not work. I do have some sympathy with the view that<br />
the compatibilist account of free will does not quite capture the ordinary<br />
person’s concept of free will. This, however, is because the ordinary person’s<br />
concept of free will, if one gets him or her arguing in a pub, say, is inconsistent.<br />
The ordinary person wants the action to be determined, not merely<br />
r<strong>and</strong>om, but undetermined too. The compatibilist can say that if this is the<br />
concept of free will we clearly do not have free will, just as I don’t have a<br />
round square table in my study. Once more the free will defence fails.<br />
I hold, therefore, that the free will defence does not hold even for moral<br />
evils, evils due to the misuse of free will. In any case natural evils provide the<br />
biggest difficulty for the theist. Unconvincing replies are sometimes brought<br />
up. If people starve in a drought they are blamed for lack of foresight. This is<br />
a cruel reply <strong>and</strong> anyway presupposes a retributionist God. Moreover what<br />
wrong choice has been made by a child dying of cancer? As to the reply that<br />
natural evils are due to immoral choices by fallen angels, the reply seems to be<br />
quite fanciful. Furthermore, if my remarks about free will are correct God<br />
could have arranged it that angels acted freely <strong>and</strong> never fell. Waiving all<br />
these points also, one wonders how an omnipotent God would allow the<br />
fallen angels to get away with it. A benevolent government with sufficient<br />
power would arrest, imprison, or even execute a very devilish criminal who<br />
otherwise would kill millions.