Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Reply to Smart 173<br />
philosophical physicalism turns out to have its own non-material objects,<br />
namely space–time points, numbers <strong>and</strong> sets. Just how far his views are removed<br />
from pre-philosophical thought is made clear when he observes that ‘If Quine<br />
is right [which Smart takes to be so] we must regard the mathematical objects<br />
as physical, <strong>and</strong> yet they are not material’ (chapter 1, p. 10).<br />
Let me repeat that here I am not challenging these opinions, let alone<br />
criticizing Smart for holding them. The point is rather to highlight the fact<br />
that in making his case for atheism he relies upon a range of controversial<br />
metaphysical claims. There is no scope, therefore, for his rejecting theism on<br />
the grounds that, as contrasted with philosophical atheism, it is committed to<br />
strange <strong>and</strong> extravagant ideas. Ontological commitments are tied to descriptive<br />
<strong>and</strong> explanatory theses; more prosaically, we have to allow the existence of<br />
what is implied by our best attempts at underst<strong>and</strong>ing. And as Smart notes in<br />
his original essay, it is a highly contextual issue whether an explanation is<br />
simple or complex, economical or extravagant. Our situation as opponents in<br />
the debate about atheism <strong>and</strong> theism, therefore, is that we are in the same sea,<br />
if not in the same boat, using broadly similar nautical methods, but drawing<br />
different conclusions about the layout of the oceans <strong>and</strong> about the best direction<br />
in which to proceed.<br />
At the outset of his essay Smart affirms the principle that ‘an important<br />
guide to metaphysical truth is plausibility in the light of total science’ (chapter 1,<br />
p. 6 – my emphasis) <strong>and</strong> he goes on to explain that he means ‘science’ to be<br />
understood in a very broad way. This qualification is necessary if the charge of<br />
narrow scientism is to be avoided. Yet his methodological principle may still<br />
harbour some unwarranted assumptions about what qualifies as knowledge<br />
<strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing. For example, Smart lists as sciences history, archaeology<br />
<strong>and</strong> philology; in other words spheres of investigation of human actions,<br />
artefacts <strong>and</strong> meanings. But if we are concerned with underst<strong>and</strong>ing aspects<br />
of the personal then it may be that there are no law-like scientific principles<br />
to be had, only interpretations the forming of which may rest on non-discursive<br />
intuitions <strong>and</strong> emotional reactions.<br />
This consideration touches on an old issue in philosophy, namely the<br />
distinction between explanation by reference to causal regularities, <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
in terms of comprehended meanings. The German philosopher<br />
Dilthey (1833–1911) investigated the ways in which in interpretation one<br />
draws upon ‘lived experience’ (Erlebnis) <strong>and</strong> human ‘underst<strong>and</strong>ing’ (Verstehen)<br />
in order to describe, evaluate <strong>and</strong> make one’s way through the ‘life-world’<br />
(Lebenswelt). 2 Abstracting from Dilthey’s terminology the basic idea is clear<br />
enough. If we are after underst<strong>and</strong>ing, then we have to deploy the resources<br />
of our humanity; we have to let ourselves see <strong>and</strong> feel as human animals<br />
<strong>and</strong> not restrict our methods to those of a science which aspires to an ideal<br />
of describing the world in an observer-free way. Thus, to the extent that