Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

Further Reflections on Theism 231
Relatedly, there are two causal series operating in the induction of concept
use. In the example of Kirsty, James and Alice one may attend either to the
coming-to-be of an ability, or to the content of the ability, the power itself. In
arguing for a ‘first cause’ Aquinas was concerned with ontological ultimacy
not temporal primacy. Accordingly, he focusses on causal dependencies in
which members of a series can be shown to be simultaneously dependent on
an original cause. Let us say, then, that the series: a causes b, b causes c, c causes
d, is per se when a and d are contemporaneous, and the relation ‘causes’ is
transitive. In which case, a causes d in causing b and c; for example, I inscribe
my name in moving my hand and in moving the pen held in it. Here there is
an order of subordination, with the intermediary members mediating the
causality of the initiating agent; and only operating under its influence. Hence
even if the series were infinite there would still have to be a ‘First Cause’. By
contrast, the series e causes f, f causes g, g causes h, is per accidens if e and h
occur at different times and ‘causes’ is intransitive. My great-grandfather
conceived my grandfather, who conceived my father, who conceived me.
These events occurred over the course of a century and although my greatgrandfather
is among my progenitors, he did not conceive me. There seems to
be no impossibility of an infinity of causes related per accidens; that is to say,
nothing in the relation ‘conceiver of ’ shows that there must be a first member.
Likewise, nothing in the relation ‘teacher of ’ necessitates a finite series.
This much is true, but note, first, that no-one believes that the predicate
‘human teacher of ’ is infinitely applicable into the past, so such a series does
indeed strike us as finite; and, second, that even if there were an infinite series
of human teachers this would not explain the genesis of the power itself (as
against its coming to be actual in particular people). So we are obliged to seek
two related explanations: of the emergence of conceptuality in homo sapiens;
and of the source of the power of conceptuality per se. Since the first was
pursued explicitly in my original contribution, let me offer a comment on the
second. How is it possible that John came to be able to think of Molly the cat
as a cat? Because Alice helped actualize this in virtue of being able to do so.
And how did Alice come to be in that position? Because of James, and he
because of Kirsty, and so on. What is missing in this is an answer to the
question how is this ability possible at all ? How can there be conceptuality?
Kirsty possesses and exercises a power of which she is not the author, since
she is not intrinsically and essentially conceptualizing. Any antecedent source
of this (‘antecedent’ now not being thought of not temporally but ontologically)
must either be contingently conceptualizing or necessarily so; and if only
contingently then the power is not yet explained. So we move upwards through
the hierarchy to a first cause of conceptuality. In fact, although this formulation
envisages a series of intermediate members I presume there is nothing
between human conceptuality and its causative source, the mind of God.