Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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78 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
do not exist unless <strong>and</strong> until, <strong>and</strong> only so far as, they are ‘delineated’ by some<br />
classificatory scheme.<br />
There are some things for which it is plausible to make this claim. Imagine,<br />
for example, an artist, ‘Graphico’, who chooses to depict in his work only<br />
objects within certain arbitrary ranges of shapes, sizes, sources <strong>and</strong> surface<br />
textures. Perhaps he operates other criteria also, so that his work portrays a<br />
very wide variety of items that are not otherwise significantly related to one<br />
another. Engaged by his unifying vision we might then refer to the depicted<br />
objects – pieces of stone, bundles of leaves, table tops, patches of grass, cloud<br />
formations, sections of human skin, etc. – as ‘Graphics’. Here, then, we are in<br />
the position of being able to say that ‘Graphics’ do not exist independently<br />
of human beings. We can be anti-realists about ‘Graphics’; but, of course,<br />
what we mean by this is that they do not exist as Graphics independently of<br />
our classification. This identity is an artefact of human interests, in particular<br />
those of Graphico <strong>and</strong> his admirers; <strong>and</strong> we might add, therefore, ‘but of<br />
course the things in question may, <strong>and</strong> in most cases do, have a prior identity<br />
that is not of our making, a mind-independent nature’. What the metaphysical<br />
anti-realist maintains is that there are no such prior natures; everything<br />
is a practical or theoretical artefact in one way or another. Alpha particles,<br />
beech trees, cats, diphtheria, electrons, fish, et cetera ad infinitum, are all in<br />
this philosophical sense ‘mind-dependent’ entities.<br />
This is what Smart <strong>and</strong> I are united in opposing. 1 Contemporary antirealism<br />
comes in a variety of forms many of which make their claims about<br />
mind-dependence not in terms of concepts but in terms of truth. That is to<br />
say they hold that what ‘depends on us’ is whether something is true or not;<br />
truth being understood epistemologically, i.e. in terms of what is knowable<br />
through empirical confirmation or reasoning. A typical version of this formulation<br />
of anti-realism might have it that a claim is true if <strong>and</strong> only if it is, or<br />
can be, confirmed. Truth, therefore, is immanent within <strong>and</strong> not transcendent<br />
of actual <strong>and</strong> potential enquiry. Setting aside what are certainly important<br />
issues about how anti-realism is most aptly expressed, <strong>and</strong> related issues about<br />
the best formulations of realism, Smart <strong>and</strong> I maintain that the world <strong>and</strong><br />
truth are not in general of our making, <strong>and</strong> further hold that reality is a<br />
possible object of practical, scientific <strong>and</strong> philosophical investigation.<br />
Set against this background of significant agreement, however, is our<br />
opposition over the question of whether there is a God; <strong>and</strong> this difference is<br />
made more interesting, I believe, by the fact that we would each connect our<br />
realism with our perspective on the theism/atheism issue. Smart has made<br />
clear his view that underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the world as it is in itself does not call for<br />
<strong>and</strong> indeed is at odds with theism. My belief, by contrast, is that reflection on<br />
various matters, including the existence of the world <strong>and</strong> of minds that can<br />
comprehend, appreciate <strong>and</strong> act within it, leads to the conclusion that there is