Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Afterword 195<br />
consciousness on the cross before he died, even though we could never know<br />
it one way or the other.<br />
Putnam’s anti-realism has always been more moderate <strong>and</strong> further from<br />
verificationism than that associated with Dummett <strong>and</strong> Wright. His concern<br />
has been to oppose the view which he describes as ‘metaphysical realism’ <strong>and</strong><br />
which he takes to consist principally in the claim that there is a privileged<br />
account of reality independent of observer’s interests, a true theory of it as it<br />
is in itself apart from any representational scheme. Instead, Putnam insists<br />
that the evident fact of conceptual relativity – that all thought is structured by<br />
principles of classification – must be accommodated; but that this can be<br />
achieved in a manner that allows us to hold on to the common sense idea that<br />
there is (usually) a fact of the matter as to whether what we say of the world<br />
is true or false. This combination of conceptual relativity <strong>and</strong> facticity yields<br />
‘internal realism’ (or the more recently coined ‘realism with a human face’)<br />
according to which within physics, natural history, etc., one may be a realist.<br />
For example, one may meaningfully <strong>and</strong> truthfully assert the real existence of<br />
electrons, or the occurrence of past events for which no evidence remains. Yet<br />
it remains an error to suppose that physics or natural history are maps of the<br />
pre-existing, mind-independent geography of reality. There is no such thing<br />
as the way the world is, only the way it is relative to one or another system of<br />
description, explanation <strong>and</strong> evaluation.<br />
Independently of this present work we have both been intrigued by, <strong>and</strong><br />
have written about, Putnam’s evolving attitude to the question of metaphysical<br />
realism. This is in part because we have thought he is mistaken, <strong>and</strong> in<br />
part because like others we have found him to be one of the best proponents<br />
of anti-realist thought <strong>and</strong> thus a helpful critic of realism. Yet while we seem<br />
to agree in broad outline on the form of a general response to one important<br />
element in Putnam’s anti-realist challenge, we differ significantly in how we<br />
think realism itself should accommodate certain of his critical points. Since<br />
this difference relates to our earlier disagreements about reductionism, which<br />
in turn are related to the prospects of an ‘old style’ teleological argument, it<br />
may be worth commenting on it briefly.<br />
First our agreement. Realism is an ontological thesis <strong>and</strong> not, as<br />
Putnam <strong>and</strong> others have often painted it, an epistemological one: it concerns<br />
existence not knowledge or conceptualization. Consequently, no theory of<br />
representation or justification by itself implies the denial of realism.<br />
What may or may not be conceived or recognized is one thing, what exists<br />
is another. Put simply, metaphysical realism maintains that the way(s)<br />
things are is logically independent of our way(s) of thinking about them.<br />
Unsurprisingly, realists usually aim to add an account of representation<br />
or intentionality to the metaphysical thesis, but to do so is a matter of<br />
addition <strong>and</strong> any inadequacies in such accounts do not imperil ontological<br />
realism itself.