Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

Further Reflections on Theism 223
philosophy of probability to inductive reasoning about the origins of the
cosmos and the patterns of its operation; and next provided systematic defences
of Christian theological concepts. Thanks to the efforts of these and others,
the defensiveness, dreariness, dullness and near agnosticism characteristic of
most philosophy of religion in the post-war years came steadily to be replaced
by confident, imaginative and lively writings, typically authored by practising
Christians (though with distinguished contributions from non-Christian theists,
agnostics and atheists).
That was all to the good, but in view of the evidently bullish confidence
of some analytical philosophers of religion it may be worth striking a cautionary
note. Whereas it was once common for those entering higher education
to have a reasonable level of religious knowledge, and often some religious
formation, be it conventional and minimalist, that has changed considerably.
In consequence, rising generations of able philosophers are now less likely to
be engaged by religious questions. At the same time there is a general intellectual
scepticism about the plausibility and even the intelligibility of largescale,
comprehensive conceptions or explanations of the human condition. In
an age in which relativisms and special interests have fragmented intellectual
culture producing a plurality of ‘micro-stories’, the very idea of the ‘metanarrative’
has been ‘problematised’. In consequence of this and of the previous
point, philosophy of religion may soon face something of a struggle. Cultural
theory is happier to engage its nominal subject matter than it once was, but
it does so in ways that are broadly sociological rather than analytical; being
concerned with causes, conditions and contexts more than with rational content
and argumentation.
Rather than auguring ill for the philosophical exploration of religion I think
this situation presents the challenge of engaging colleagues who are not part
of a self-identifying professional constituency, and calls for serious interaction
with advocates of non-analytical, and even non-philosophical approaches. One
merit of the current debate, therefore, testified to by the large number of
reviews which the first edition attracted, is that by not being, and not being
seen as, a piece of specialized philosophy of religion, by making a point of
bringing in matters of science, religious studies and theological doctrine,
and by being avowedly committed to definite positions, it has engaged philosophers
and philosophy students with very different interests and inclinations,
and reached a wider readership. That represents a hope fulfilled.
3 The Emergence of Life and the Origins of Reproduction
Looking back at my original contributions and at the criticisms of Smart and
others I recognize that there are parts of my case that need clarification