Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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160 J.J.C. Smart<br />
5 Eternity <strong>and</strong> Sempiternity<br />
In my discussion of the cosmological argument I suggested that the theist is<br />
on stronger ground (though in the end I thought still not on strong enough<br />
ground) if he or she thought of the Deity as an eternal or atemporal being<br />
who causes the existence of the whole space–time universe in some tenseless<br />
sense of ‘cause’. So God would not be a first cause in any temporal sense of<br />
‘first’. This would be a plausible modification of Aquinas’s view in his ‘third<br />
way’. (As he puts it himself Aquinas seems to me to refer unnecessarily to<br />
temporal matters.) So if I can be an ‘angel’s advocate’ (i.e. the contrary of<br />
a devil’s advocate) <strong>Haldane</strong>’s argument for a first cause in the temporal sense<br />
is unnecessary. The universe might have no first cause because it might be<br />
like this: . . . big bang, big crunch, big bang, big crunch ..., with an infinite<br />
sequence of big bangs <strong>and</strong> big crunches in both temporal directions. Or it<br />
might be a space–time whose topology is such that it makes no sense to talk<br />
of a beginning in time. Stephen Hawking proposed the latter possibility in a<br />
conference at the Vatican. Hawking seemed to think that his proposal could<br />
have been seen as shocking, 23 but I do not think that it ought to have worried<br />
an admirer of Aquinas. Aquinas can be supposed to have thought of God as<br />
imperishable in the sense of necessarily being unable to be destroyed, <strong>and</strong> being<br />
such that its being destroyed makes no sense, not being sempiternal, not even<br />
necessarily sempiternal, but outside time like the number 9. Or perhaps like<br />
the whole space–time universe which cannot be said to change or stay the same.<br />
I hold that to say that a signal lamp changes (tenseless present) is to say that<br />
a later temporal stage of the lamp differs (tenseless present) from an earlier<br />
temporal stage. The whole space–time universe obviously cannot change in<br />
this way. Presumably God would be something very different from the number<br />
9 <strong>and</strong> different from the space–time universe. (At least if we can rule out<br />
pantheism.) Of course God is thought of as everywhere <strong>and</strong> everywhen, but<br />
this could be interpreted in terms of an atemporal being having various relations<br />
to every point of space–time. I hold that God as the creator of the universe<br />
<strong>and</strong> hence of space–time itself could not be a spatio-temporal being (or a<br />
spatial or temporal one). Later in his essay <strong>Haldane</strong> seems to be in agreement<br />
that an adequate conception of God should be that of an atemporal being.<br />
After this brief excursion into being an ‘angel’s advocate’ I still have my<br />
bothers about the notion of a necessary being <strong>and</strong> of whether the complexity<br />
of God’s nature (his desires <strong>and</strong> power to create ex nihilo) does not mirror the<br />
complexity of the laws of nature themselves. In the latter case Ockham’s razor<br />
would be a problem for the theist.<br />
Aquinas seems to elucidate necessity by contrast with the contingency of<br />
perishable things. His discussion needs a bit of modification if we are to look