Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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126 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
I have no wish to deny the phenomena <strong>and</strong> save ‘sufficiency’ by insisting<br />
that, after all, there must have been determinacy. Instead I claim that a cause<br />
need not be a sufficient condition in the sense presumed by determinism. There<br />
is a very natural <strong>and</strong> widely exercised way of thinking according to which a<br />
sufficient cause is a ‘cause enough’ <strong>and</strong> a sufficient explanation an ‘explanation<br />
enough’. In these terms the quantum events do have an explanation. For<br />
example, it may be a property of the experimental set-up that a certain percentage<br />
of emissions follow a given pattern. To observe this is not necessarily<br />
to confine oneself to a statistical description. Indeed, I take it that the point<br />
of a realist interpretation is to attribute a natural propensity to the system.<br />
Propensities are explanatory even when they are non-deterministic. If I say<br />
that an event occurred because of a reactive tendency I have answered the<br />
question ‘why?’ in a way that I have not if I say it just occurred. ‘Such things<br />
happen’ can be an empty response but it need not be, <strong>and</strong> will not, where the<br />
occurrence is attributed to well-established causal powers. A cause is a factor<br />
that makes something to be the case; an explanation is an account of why<br />
something is the case in terms of a cause. Where the cause is efficient <strong>and</strong><br />
deterministic an explanation may be inadequate if it falls short of showing<br />
that, in the circumstances, only the event in question could have occurred; it<br />
is certainly incomplete. But an explanation of an event is not shown to be<br />
inadequate or incomplete if it does not cite a deterministic cause.<br />
Given the arguments of this section, I conclude that per se efficient cause<br />
series cannot be self-explanatory; that Hume’s conceivability argument in<br />
support of brute contingency fails, <strong>and</strong> that quantum mechanics presents no<br />
counter-example to the principle of sufficient reason – on the contrary it is a<br />
useful reminder of the fact that while the search for explanations is a guiding<br />
principle of science we do not always require them to be deterministic.<br />
The questions of existential <strong>and</strong> causal dependency, therefore, are real ones,<br />
unanswerable by science but answered by postulating a Prime Cause of the<br />
existence of the universe. The ‘old’ <strong>and</strong> ‘new’ teleological arguments add to<br />
this the hypothesis that the Cause of the world is also a source of regularity <strong>and</strong><br />
beneficial order; <strong>and</strong> the argument from conceptual thought <strong>and</strong> action imply<br />
that this causal source is minded <strong>and</strong> a conceptual influence upon human<br />
thought (et hoc dicimus Deum).<br />
7 God <strong>and</strong> the World<br />
And this we call ‘God’? While some philosophers have rejected the traditional<br />
proofs outright, others have been willing to grant something to cosmological<br />
<strong>and</strong> teleological arguments but then query the theistic interpretation of their<br />
conclusions. Among those who reject the proofs some go so far as to argue