Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 107<br />
possession of the one property necessitates possession of the other. Yet triangularity<br />
<strong>and</strong> trilaterality are not the same attribute, <strong>and</strong> it takes geometrical<br />
reasoning to show that these properties are necessarily co-instantiated. This<br />
latter possibility raises what for the empiricist is the spectre of a priori knowledge,<br />
i.e., true, appropriately warranted belief that does not require to be<br />
verified in experience – because it could not fail to be.<br />
These are various aspects of a general problem for the naturalist. Our<br />
concepts transcend material configurations in space–time. As was observed<br />
earlier, to think of an item is always to think of it via some conception.<br />
A naturalistic account of experience <strong>and</strong> thought will need to relate such ways<br />
of thinking to the nature of the objects in question, <strong>and</strong> very likely add that<br />
the genesis of our concepts derives (in whole or in part) from the causal<br />
influence on us or on earlier generations of particular material objects. The<br />
trouble with this is brought about by the trilateral/triangular example. To<br />
the extent that he can even concede that there are distinct properties the<br />
naturalist will want to insist that the causal powers – as he conceives them –<br />
of trilaterals <strong>and</strong> triangulars are identical. Thus he cannot explain the difference<br />
between the concepts by invoking causal differences between the members<br />
of their extensions (as one might seem to be able to account for the difference<br />
between the concepts square <strong>and</strong> circle). For any naturally individuated object<br />
or property there are indefinitely many non-equivalent ways of thinking about<br />
it. That is to say, the structure of the conceptual order, which is expressed in<br />
judgements <strong>and</strong> actions, is richer <strong>and</strong> more abstract than that of the natural<br />
order, <strong>and</strong> the character of this difference makes it difficult to see how the<br />
materialist could explain the former as arising out of the latter.<br />
In summary, I have been arguing that there is a good deal of life remaining<br />
in ‘old style’ design arguments. Evolutionary theory, <strong>and</strong> naturalism more<br />
generally, are not equipped to explain three important differences which common<br />
sense <strong>and</strong> philosophically unprejudiced science both recognize: those<br />
between the inanimate <strong>and</strong> the animate; the non-reproductive <strong>and</strong> the reproductive;<br />
<strong>and</strong> the non-mental <strong>and</strong> the mental. Assuming a history of development,<br />
these differences involve a series of ascents giving rise to explanatory<br />
gaps in evolutionary theory. Naturalism, in its modern materialist versions,<br />
has negative <strong>and</strong> positive aspects. It precludes certain sorts of explanations on<br />
the grounds that they are incompatible with physicalism, <strong>and</strong> it presumes the<br />
availability, in principle, of wholly adequate naturalistic accounts of reality.<br />
I have been arguing that in its negative aspect it begs the question in its own<br />
favour, <strong>and</strong> that its positive claim is demonstrably false in respect of one or<br />
more features of the world.<br />
One reaction to this might be to concede both aspects of the case against<br />
naturalism, yet to query whether it advances the cause of theism. Philosophers<br />
<strong>and</strong> others have written disparagingly of ‘God of the gaps’ apologetics,