Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Further Reflections on <strong>Theism</strong> 247<br />
assuming what is implicit in the second premise, namely that it is impossible<br />
that a natural desire should be frustrated, then the conclusion follows from<br />
the premisses. Of course, what the critics ridicule is not the logic of such<br />
arguments but the assumptions themselves. It is largely an empirical matter<br />
whether there is, in fact, a natural religious desire <strong>and</strong>, if there is, how<br />
extensively it is distributed. Given that desires are identified by their objects,<br />
by what they are desires for, that we typically know what people desire by<br />
hearing what they say <strong>and</strong> watching what they do, <strong>and</strong> that the meaning of<br />
what is said <strong>and</strong> done is often ambiguous, sometimes opaque, <strong>and</strong> generally<br />
indeterminate, there is scope for difficulty in even resolving what is to count<br />
as evidence for attributing religious desire. This is why the question of its<br />
existence is not wholly empirical: it is also conceptual. Several times in his<br />
contribution Jack Smart speaks of his wonder at the ultimate mysteriousness<br />
of the universe, the fact of its existence. He confesses to feelings of awe in the<br />
face of this <strong>and</strong> even to a ‘sneaking’ appreciation for Heidegger’s pressing of<br />
the question of why there is anything at all. This recurrent desire for an<br />
answer to the question of being is, I think, a religious one; it is a ‘why’ for<br />
which God is the only possible answer. Less abstractly, cultural anthropology,<br />
history, <strong>and</strong> the arts <strong>and</strong> literature, as well as specifically religious forms of<br />
human organization <strong>and</strong> practice suggest that more explicitly religious desires<br />
are extensively <strong>and</strong> deeply rooted.<br />
The real problem, then, would seem to attach to the second premise. Why<br />
on earth should we think that every natural desire has a real object, let alone<br />
that this object will be attained? After all when philosophers want to illustrate<br />
intensionality they often cite cases of a desire for something that does not<br />
exist (as when Smart gives the example ‘Joe wants a unicorn’, p. 156). If one<br />
were already persuaded that God exists then one might see it as providential<br />
that we have implanted in us a desire for God, <strong>and</strong> see that this desire is not<br />
destined to be frustrated for want of an object. But I cannot simply assume<br />
theism, so how else might the desire for God be invoked? The answer,<br />
I believe, is as part of an inference to the best explanation. At the very outset<br />
of his Confessions St Augustine writes: ‘You made us for yourself, Lord; <strong>and</strong><br />
our hearts are restless until they come to rest in you.’ I have read this sentence<br />
many times: when things have been going well <strong>and</strong> when they have been<br />
going badly; when I have been confident in my beliefs <strong>and</strong> when I have<br />
doubted them; when feeling lifted by grace <strong>and</strong> when feeling burdened by sin.<br />
Augustine’s words seem ever apt, <strong>and</strong> I ask myself why that should be. The<br />
answer is just a repetition of the words themselves: ‘our hearts are restless<br />
until they come to rest in you’. Our striving <strong>and</strong> struggling, wishing <strong>and</strong><br />
wanting, seek completion in something that is itself complete (without beginning<br />
or end); something that made us for itself, not as an act of narcissism<br />
but as one of gratuitous generosity, <strong>and</strong> something that has the power to