Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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124 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
[I]t will be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment,<br />
<strong>and</strong> existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or<br />
productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that<br />
of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; <strong>and</strong> consequently<br />
the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies<br />
no contradiction or absurdity; <strong>and</strong> is therefore incapable of being refuted by<br />
any reasoning from mere ideas; without which ’tis impossible to demonstrate<br />
the necessity of a cause. 19<br />
This short passage draws heavily on Hume’s epistemology <strong>and</strong> metaphysics,<br />
both of which have been important ingredients in the modern philosophical<br />
case for atheism. Here, however, I am only concerned with the liberality<br />
of the reasoning about what is possible <strong>and</strong> impossible. Hume takes it to<br />
be sufficient to show that things can come into being without a cause that we<br />
can ‘conceive’ this, i.e. imagine it, without contradiction. Hence no argument<br />
from our mere ideas can refute the claim that things can begin to exist<br />
uncaused. Clearly this implies the denial of the principle of sufficient reason<br />
in even a weak form – for example, that where something comes to be,<br />
including a change, there is something true to be said that renders it intelligible,<br />
answering to the question ‘why?’ One response to Hume might pick up<br />
his phrase ‘mere ideas’ <strong>and</strong> emphasize the element of ‘mereness’, conceding<br />
that on some interpretation of this it may well be that no such ideas can serve<br />
to refute the denial of the causal dependence of contingent existence but that<br />
nothing of any serious interest follows. Suppose, for example, one were to<br />
contrast ‘mere ideas’ with ‘adequate concepts’, it being a defining condition of<br />
the latter (but not the former) that they are reality-reflecting <strong>and</strong> rationally<br />
constrained; then while mere ideas might fail to reveal an impossibility of<br />
causeless coming to be, thinking with adequate concepts does establish this.<br />
The realist, be he a theist or not, has reason to maintain that there are<br />
adequate concepts more than mere ideas, for otherwise general scepticism<br />
<strong>and</strong>/or anti-realism become inescapable. Of itself this does not vindicate the<br />
principle but it blocks part of an argument from imagination to fact.<br />
Additionally, however, Hume offers no account of how we might determine<br />
the content of conceptions based on images <strong>and</strong> mere ideas. Try to test<br />
his argument by imagining for yourself something popping into existence, or<br />
changing, uncaused. You are sitting at an empty desk looking at its surface<br />
<strong>and</strong> all of a sudden a book, or an apple, or a lump of unidentifiable matter<br />
appears before you, or the desk top changes colour. That is imaginable,<br />
but what is neither given nor required by the scenario is that the objects<br />
have come to be without a cause, <strong>and</strong> that is not at all something one would<br />
suppose. Rather one would ask ‘Where have they come from?’, ‘How<br />
did they get here?’, ‘Who or what made them happen?’, <strong>and</strong> so on. In other<br />
words once one moves from Hume’s abstractions to an actual example