Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Reply to <strong>Haldane</strong> 161<br />
at things in a space–time way. Consider a thing which did not exist before<br />
time t 1 <strong>and</strong> exists until time t 2 when it perishes, that is, it contains no temporal<br />
part later than t 2. (Note that here I am using ‘exist’, ‘contains’, etc. as tenseless<br />
verbs.) Well, there is no temporal stage later than t 2 <strong>and</strong> no temporal stage<br />
earlier than t 1. But might the temporal stage between t 1 <strong>and</strong> t 2 have not<br />
existed? Or could we say that the t 1 to t 2 stage was necessary though perishable?<br />
If there were a suitable sense of ‘necessary’ (which I am querying)<br />
perhaps we could have said this, but no doubt we would not have done so<br />
because if there had been a temporal stage later than t 2 it would have been<br />
very like the t 1 to t 2 stage, <strong>and</strong> would therefore have been necessary too. Thus<br />
I think that I can agree with Aquinas that the perishable is contingent.<br />
I doubt, however, whether everything that is contingent is perishable. What<br />
about an instantaneous event for example? Also in my longer essay I raised<br />
doubts about the necessity of Platonic entities. Of course Aquinas was talking<br />
about substances. I do have some trouble with the Aristotelian notion of<br />
substance, in so far as metaphysically I like to think of the world as a fourdimensional<br />
space–time entity. 24 However, setting this aside, let me raise<br />
some doubts about the Aristotelian <strong>and</strong> Thomist notions of substance which<br />
are more properly related to some things which <strong>Haldane</strong> says in his essay.<br />
I am indeed not clear how far an Aristotelian notion of substance could<br />
be made to fit a scientifically oriented view of the world. Is an electron a<br />
substance? Consider quantum statistics, in which one distribution of particles<br />
is sometimes to be considered as the same state as another. Swapping over<br />
two particles makes no difference. This makes such a particle unlike a<br />
substance as traditionally conceived. One rough analogy would be a wave.<br />
A wave in the sea is not constituted by the water: as the wave goes forward<br />
the water under it is not the same. We could swap over two waves of the<br />
same form without making any difference to the sea. Indeed, it wouldn’t<br />
really be a swap, as it would be if we swapped over the actual water under the<br />
waves. Again, another analogy might be the idea that what exist are just<br />
space–time points <strong>and</strong> field strengths characteristic of these points. I do not<br />
want to press this objection to Aristotelianism <strong>and</strong> Thomism too hard, because<br />
I suspect that someone as familiar with these ways of thought as <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
is could reconcile talk of substance <strong>and</strong> attributes, potentiality <strong>and</strong> actuality<br />
with the considerations that I have suggested here.<br />
<strong>Haldane</strong> points out that what the traditional arguments for the existence<br />
of God should be taken as proving is the thatness not the whatness of God.<br />
There must surely be some whatness in what is proved. To prove the existence<br />
of a something I know not what is hardly to prove the existence of anything.<br />
However, it does resonate with the expressions of yearning by some antidogmatic<br />
church-goers. ‘I feel that there must be something.’ This ties up with a<br />
feeling that an atheist can have: a feeling of the evident ultimate mysteriousness