Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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Reply to <strong>Haldane</strong> 155<br />
the molecules might be rather large <strong>and</strong> complex <strong>and</strong> a complete quantum<br />
mechanical account of the process could be beyond the fastest computers. We<br />
could still feel, as Weinberg suggested, that there is some sort of explanation<br />
of the chemical process. We could say that the chemical process is similar<br />
to that in the simple case, <strong>and</strong> that prediction is here defeated only by sheer<br />
complexity. Similar situations of course exist with respect to deterministic<br />
mechanisms in classical mechanics, as it is demonstrated in chaos theory.<br />
Chaotic systems can indeed be deterministic but unpredictable.<br />
On p. 93 <strong>Haldane</strong> says that if a materialist explanation of life seems<br />
incomplete then ‘only a non-scientific insistence on reductionism motivates<br />
the thesis that [living systems] must be no more than mechanism even<br />
where there could be no deductive explanation of how it is so’. I would reply<br />
that if there are plausible ideas about how something could be so, in accordance<br />
with naturalistic principles, even though this cannot be deduced in<br />
detail, <strong>and</strong> if there are no plausible alternative naturalistic explanations, then<br />
it is reasonable to suppose that things did come about in the hypothesized<br />
way. I do not think that scientists regard this sort of reasoning as ‘unscientific’,<br />
even though (often per impossibile) detailed predictions or retrodictions<br />
would be regarded by them as better. Rejection of appeal to non-natural<br />
causes (in any of the senses of ‘cause’ distinguished by <strong>Haldane</strong>) is really<br />
only an application of Ockham’s razor, the principle that entities should<br />
not be multiplied beyond necessity. No doubt <strong>Haldane</strong> holds that the nonnaturalistic<br />
explanation is simpler, but any appearance of simplicity could<br />
be deceptive, if the appeal is simply to a God whose ways are beyond our ken.<br />
I agree that the argument is not over. Readers of this book must make up<br />
their own minds.<br />
2 Representation <strong>and</strong> Intentionality<br />
On p. 91 <strong>Haldane</strong> sees difficulties for naturalism in the notions of representation<br />
<strong>and</strong> intentionality. Now undoubtedly there are such things as representations.<br />
A portrait is a representation of a person, <strong>and</strong> an irregular blue<br />
line on a map is a representation of the twists <strong>and</strong> turns of a river. Whether<br />
there are representations in the brain or mind is a further matter, <strong>and</strong> quite<br />
controversial. For example, if the brain is entirely a connectionist device then<br />
there is no place for representations (pictures?) in any obvious sense. Perhaps<br />
‘information’ is a more useful word than is ‘representation’, in a rather<br />
abstract, information-theoretic use of the term ‘information’. It is a familiar<br />
thought that DNA codes genetic information, much as instructions in a<br />
computer are programmed in. There seems to be nothing very difficult<br />
for naturalism in supposing that such capacities for acquiring <strong>and</strong> storing