Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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132 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
lying in the bowl. In each case there is a (movable) ‘place’ in the universe that<br />
is the location for the instantiation of these forms, <strong>and</strong> which is also the site<br />
<strong>and</strong> range of possibilities of change in respect of them. Matter is the potentiality<br />
for the instantiation of form, <strong>and</strong> form is the nature or characteristic<br />
that is instantiated.<br />
This account explains what it is to be a particular thing, <strong>and</strong> thereby<br />
provides a basis for distinguishing between things <strong>and</strong> for identifying <strong>and</strong><br />
reidentifying them. As kinds of fruit, apples <strong>and</strong> pears differ with regard to<br />
their defining properties or forms. As particular pieces of fruit, two apples may<br />
not differ qualitatively, but necessarily they will differ with regard to matter,<br />
i.e. each has its own ‘site’ of instantiation <strong>and</strong> transformation. And we can<br />
conclude by implication that an apple viewed on Friday is one <strong>and</strong> the same<br />
as that seen on Monday if <strong>and</strong> only if it is the same composite of form <strong>and</strong><br />
matter (or what may be equivalent, the one <strong>and</strong> only spatio-temporally continuous<br />
organization of certain attributes).<br />
With this analysis in mind we can now say that that which is the cause<br />
of things cannot itself be composite <strong>and</strong> hence must be simple. It cannot<br />
be composed of metaphysical parts such as substance <strong>and</strong> attribute, matter<br />
<strong>and</strong> form, potentiality <strong>and</strong> actuality, <strong>and</strong> so on; for in being of necessity<br />
unchanging it has no unrealized potentiality, <strong>and</strong> in necessarily lacking<br />
potentiality it has no matter; <strong>and</strong> in having no matter it has no basis for<br />
individuality; <strong>and</strong> in being devoid of individuality it cannot be a particular<br />
substance possessed of essential <strong>and</strong> accidental attributes. In short, God is<br />
necessarily simple. He is not a something or other, a this or that; but nor of<br />
course is God nothing. Rather we might say, as does Meister Eckhart in<br />
a series of fascinating philosophical reflections, that God is no-thing. 20 Or<br />
as Wittgenstein wrote in a quite different context ‘It is not a something but<br />
not a nothing either’. 21<br />
In developing this sort of argument I am following the style <strong>and</strong> direction<br />
of speculation advanced by St Thomas, his scholastic followers <strong>and</strong><br />
more recent analytical philosophers of religion. This speculation traces to <strong>and</strong><br />
fro a series of mutual implications between various conditions: impassibility,<br />
immateriality, eternity, omnipotence, perfection, simplicity, necessary existence,<br />
<strong>and</strong> so on, drawing out various relations of dependence, sufficiency <strong>and</strong><br />
equivalence. Before proceeding I want to mention a couple of these conditions<br />
<strong>and</strong> certain ways of thinking about them which are sometimes held to<br />
be problematic.<br />
It is often maintained that God is identical with his essence, <strong>and</strong> that the<br />
divine attributes are one. Such claims might seem to be at odds with my<br />
earlier denials that God is subject to various distinctions, <strong>and</strong> in a sense that<br />
is so. Nonetheless, although they use terminology that is more properly<br />
attributable to natural beings these ways of speaking aim to make appropriate