Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism

108 J.J. Haldane
meaning by this the effort to save religion from the onward march of scientific
naturalism by finding phenomena for which science has not provided
an explanation. These critics have not been short of targets to aim at. For
example, it will not do to assert that scientific materialism fails because it
cannot explain visitations by the spirits of the deceased. That would indeed
be question-begging (and involves a metaphysical assumption of ‘spiritualism’
that not all theists would accept). Less obviously it is not an effective strategy
to point to gaps in the scientific story where one cannot show that they
are non-contingent omissions. The fact that a theory has not explained a
phenomenon in no way establishes that it cannot do so. It is partly with this
thought in mind that ‘God of the gaps’ defences have usually been criticized.
I hope it is clear, therefore, that I have not been concerned with contingent
limitations. At least, I mean to have identified necessary limitations, phenomena
that it is not within the power of scientific naturalism to explain, and given
reasons why I believe this to be so.
It may still seem, however, that allowing what has been argued, no
movement has been made towards establishing the existence of a creative
deity, as opposed to demonstrating a series of mysteries. The earlier ‘gaps’
criticism might now be directed against what could be seen as simply labelling
these enigmas ‘works of God’. Against this charge let me recall relevant
features of the previous reflections. Throughout I have been concerned with
teleology, that is to say with natures, powers, functions and activities the
description and explanation of which make reference to instrumental values
and final ends. The reproductive behaviour of fleas and the intellectual
studies of philosophers can be engaged in well or badly and lead to good or
ill. Whatever other functions and goals it may serve, sex is for reproduction;
likewise practical reasoning is for successful action, and philosophical
speculation is for the sake of attaining and understanding truth.
Descriptions and explanations in terms of purposes cannot be ignored. They
can only be rejected in favour of mechanism or attributed to the agency of
a designer. I have argued at length that the mechanistic option fails especially
in relation to thought and action. What then of sources of design?
Often these will be empirical agents. In recent years, for example, there has
been much research in genetic engineering, and recall the less ‘high-tech’
image of the gardener discussed earlier. In both cases organisms are evolved
that possess functional features whose existence and character is attributable
to human design. But this form of explanation is inadequate in cases
where the teleology is that of entities which have emerged independently of
human intervention; and it also fails as an explanation of Homo sapiens itself
– or at least if someone wants to argue that human teleology is due to our
having been designed by extraterrestrials then he has an obvious regress on
his hands.