Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
134 J.J. <strong>Haldane</strong><br />
From Creature to Creator<br />
In the introduction to the present section, I mentioned that some who reject<br />
the traditional proofs also maintain that there can be no reasoning from the<br />
world to God. Various accounts of this impossibility are offered but I shall<br />
only address what I take to be the general form of the objection. It is usually<br />
attributed to Kant but it certainly pre-dates his writings <strong>and</strong> is probably as old<br />
as systematic arguments for the existence of God. The basic idea is that as a<br />
matter of logic we cannot reason from the conditions of the empirical world<br />
to the conditions of a transcendent super-empirical reality. Sometimes this is<br />
taken to establish a mere limitation deriving from the fact that our concepts<br />
are acquired from, or are otherwise keyed to the empirical world <strong>and</strong> so can<br />
be presumed to fail of meaning when we try to apply them beyond this. At<br />
other times it is argued that any attempt to apply them ‘transcendentally’ will<br />
yield contradictions.<br />
As regards the first of these contentions I would only observe that, as was<br />
seen earlier, it rests on a series of controversial assumptions about the source<br />
<strong>and</strong> scope of meaning. First, it may be contested that all our concepts derive<br />
from empirical experience; but even if this were granted it is a further question<br />
whether this implies any confinement of their scope. Consider the terms<br />
‘planet’, ‘distant’ <strong>and</strong> ‘travelled to’. Each might be held to derive ultimately<br />
from experience, but it is clear that we can easily construct a complex term<br />
‘planet more distant than has been travelled to’ <strong>and</strong> apply it out of the range<br />
of our actual <strong>and</strong> perhaps even our possible experience. This is not a rare<br />
linguistic or conceptual phenomenon. We are forever talking <strong>and</strong> thinking<br />
about entities that we do not <strong>and</strong> could not experience, for example, unrealized<br />
hypothetical situations, unobservable (but presumed to be actual) objects<br />
<strong>and</strong> events, infinitely large domains, <strong>and</strong> so on. We talk <strong>and</strong> think about<br />
the unrecoverable past <strong>and</strong> the as yet non-existent future; about the spatially<br />
distant <strong>and</strong> about the non-spatial <strong>and</strong> abstract realms of mathematics <strong>and</strong><br />
philosophy.<br />
Of course, someone might want to argue that all of these efforts are in<br />
vain, or contend that while some are legitimate nonetheless the particular<br />
ways of thinking presumed upon by proofs for the existence of God are<br />
unavailable to us. It is difficult to see how anything sensible could be made of<br />
the former claim, since it would exclude vast tracts of what we otherwise take<br />
to be perfectly sensible, explanatory <strong>and</strong> truth-detecting forms of thought,<br />
including, let it be clearly noted, much <strong>and</strong> perhaps most fundamental science.<br />
So far as the second contention is concerned, it supposes that the<br />
concepts deployed in the proofs, or the ways in which they are used, can be<br />
separated off from other unproblematic notions or uses. But again it is hard<br />
to imagine this being done in any coherent <strong>and</strong> convincing way. Moreover,