Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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<strong>Atheism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong> 99<br />
Taking these in reverse order, the issue of whether the physicalist worldview<br />
is adequate is precisely what is in question <strong>and</strong> so it cannot be assumed<br />
as part of a case against any alternative. Equally the idea that acknowledgement<br />
of mental attributes is incompatible with physics is only true if by<br />
‘physics’ one means not physical science but physicalism, the doctrine that<br />
there is nothing other than what physics deals with. Certainly the latter is<br />
incompatible with acceptance of sui generis psychological states <strong>and</strong> features,<br />
let alone the existence of an immaterial deity, but again the truth of physicalism<br />
is what is at issue. It cannot be part of an argument in favour of itself.<br />
As regards what one might term ‘the argument from causation’ recall my<br />
earlier comments about the variability of causal (‘because’) explanations. When<br />
we say ‘Kirsty wrote because she wanted to communicate’ <strong>and</strong> ‘her body<br />
moved because of events in her brain’ it is by no means obvious that the two<br />
‘becauses’ signify the same kind of relation. In the second case we are dealing<br />
with efficient causation; very crudely, a case of an energy transfer communicated<br />
from one place to another through the intervening physical medium,<br />
sections of the body. But in the first case what ‘because’ introduces seems to<br />
be an item from the rational <strong>and</strong> not the physical order; in Aristotelian–<br />
Thomistic terms it is a formal-cum-final cause. Compare this with the difference<br />
between saying ‘the circular stain on the table is there because of a coffee<br />
mug’, <strong>and</strong> saying ‘the area of the stain is not equal to that of a square of the<br />
same breadth because it has a circular boundary’. In the first case the base of<br />
the mug left an impression on a surface, but in the second, circularity is not<br />
doing any impacting or pushing, the relation in question is an abstract geometrical<br />
one. So from the fact that ‘because’ features in explanations of writing<br />
<strong>and</strong> of bodily movements we cannot immediately proceed to the conclusion<br />
that both are statements of efficient causation, <strong>and</strong> then look for this single<br />
inner causal factor.<br />
Moreover, the causal argument I sketched helped itself to an ambiguity<br />
in the term ‘behaviour’. We can say the writing was a piece of behaviour on<br />
Kirsty’s part, <strong>and</strong> that during the relevant period her body was behaving in<br />
various ways. But it would be another hasty inference to suppose that what is<br />
referred to is the same in both cases, <strong>and</strong> thus that if the cause of the latter<br />
was a set of brain events then ex hypothesi this was the cause of the former.<br />
Writing is intentional behaviour, i.e. action; bodily movements may or may<br />
not be intentional. So although there is an appropriate use of the term by<br />
which we may speak of the behaviour of muscles <strong>and</strong> bones it would be a<br />
fallacy of equivocation to infer that movements <strong>and</strong> actions are one <strong>and</strong> the<br />
same. Of course, this fails to show that they are not the same; for all I have<br />
just said they could be. The point was rather to defuse an argument that<br />
assumed they were, <strong>and</strong> on that basis inferred that actions are nothing other<br />
than bodily movements effected by brain events.