Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Further Reflections on <strong>Atheism</strong> 207<br />
empty of information about reality, then it would seem that no analytic<br />
sentence can tell us what really exists. Or thus was Findlay’s idea.<br />
Two things make us look back with some scepticism about all this line of<br />
thought. First, there was Quine’s criticisms of the analytic–synthetic distinction.<br />
At any rate if there are analytic propositions, they are ones of no philosophical<br />
interest, for example, ‘No bachelors are married’. Secondly, it is<br />
misleading to think that mathematics is logic. Even if first-order logic has<br />
a tautological character this does not apply to set theory. As I remarked on<br />
FE p. 39, Quine has pointed out three characteristics possessed by first-order<br />
logic (with identity) but not by set theory <strong>and</strong> hence mathematics since all<br />
classical mathematics can be expressed in or mapped on to set theory.<br />
For Quine, the numbers π or e or trigonometric functions, for example,<br />
are not to be believed in a priori. They are to be believed in because of their<br />
indispensability in physics. 16 They seem to exist necessarily because they<br />
are well entrenched in our system of beliefs – more deeply entrenched <strong>and</strong><br />
immune to theory revision than electrons or curved space–time. So perhaps<br />
even assertions such as that there are infinitely many primes, or even that<br />
there is a number greater than 9, are only as a matter of degree less contingent<br />
than are the assertion of the existence of electrons <strong>and</strong> the like. For<br />
Findlay’s disproof of the existence of God he needs to deny the possibility<br />
of necessary existential statements. And yet there do seem to be such. For<br />
example, ‘there are infinitely many primes’. Perhaps, however, we confuse<br />
necessity with being eternal.<br />
5 Further Reflections on Necessity <strong>and</strong> <strong>Theism</strong><br />
We have seen cause to question the idea that mathematics is tautological<br />
or empty of ontological commitment. So the theist should do well to question<br />
Findlay’s idea that necessity derives from linguistic convention only. To be<br />
an adequate object of worship God would have to exist necessarily <strong>and</strong> his<br />
attributes would belong to him with objective necessity too. This could not be<br />
so if necessity was a mere matter of linguistic convention. Indeed, Findlay<br />
even says that the Divine Existence would be a necessary matter if we had<br />
made up our minds to speak theistically ‘whatever the empirical circumstances<br />
turned out to be’. (We might suspect that many theists are like this: consider<br />
the sailor who is saved from drowning <strong>and</strong> attributes his rescue to divine<br />
intervention, despite his knowledge of all his shipmates who drown. This is<br />
contrary to the Popperian methodology of looking for refutations rather than<br />
verifications.) Findlay refers to those who like Spinoza think theistically merely<br />
to give expression to a way of feeling about the universe, or perhaps to use the<br />
term ‘God’ to ‘cover whatever tendencies towards righteousness <strong>and</strong> beauty