Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
Atheism and Theism JJ Haldane - Common Sense Atheism
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42 J.J.C. Smart<br />
the theist in the search for some analogue of God’s necessity in that of mathematical<br />
existence.<br />
Probably, therefore, the theist’s best bet might after all be to try to defend<br />
the old fashioned form of mathematical Platonism, with its direct intuitions<br />
of a super-sensible reality (universals), which exist eternally <strong>and</strong> in some sense<br />
necessarily. If this sense of ‘necessarily’ could be made intelligible then God<br />
might be said to exist necessarily in this sense. We are led into obscurities <strong>and</strong><br />
it is, as I have said, hard to fit Platonic intuitions into modern epistemology<br />
<strong>and</strong> neurobiology.<br />
When all is said, however, it might be best for the theist to say simply<br />
‘God exists necessarily’ in the way that the number 23 does. Would this be<br />
a sort of polytheism with many necessary beings? Or would 23 be somehow<br />
part of God? I leave this question to theologians. The atheist will feel well<br />
relieved of these intractable problems.<br />
Eternity <strong>and</strong> Sempiternity<br />
In discussing the cosmological argument I took it that Aquinas was at his<br />
best in thinking of God as eternal, in the sense of not being in time at all. In<br />
this way the existence of God would be said to explain the existence of the<br />
whole space–time world (as we think of it) without being an efficient cause at<br />
the first moment of the universe’s existence, a concept which has no clear<br />
sense in modern cosmology. As I noted, the universe can have a finite past<br />
<strong>and</strong> yet have no unique first moment. Furthermore there is no unitary time.<br />
The special theory of relativity tells us that there is no preferred set of axes in<br />
Minkowski space. Still, perhaps a preferred set could be got by going outside<br />
the theory, e.g. in preferring space–time axes with respect to which the cosmic<br />
background radiation is equal in all directions. Even so, because of the<br />
expansion of the universe, these local times would lie in different space–time<br />
directions from galaxy to galaxy. Also time-like world lines get bent up in<br />
black holes (as at the beginning of the universe) <strong>and</strong> black holes may possibly<br />
spawn baby universes with their own different space–times. We should therefore<br />
be cautious about talking of God as in time, sempiternal not eternal. In<br />
what time would a sempiternal God be sempiternal in? These considerations<br />
reinforce, in my mind at least, the interpretation of God’s eternity as atemporal<br />
rather than sempiternal. In what follows I shall use ‘eternal’ in this atemporal<br />
sense <strong>and</strong> shall contrast eternity with sempiternity.<br />
William <strong>and</strong> Martha Kneale have explored the issue of eternity versus<br />
sempiternity in two scholarly <strong>and</strong> instructive papers. 80 They bring out the<br />
tensions in Aquinas’s thought. On the one h<strong>and</strong> Aquinas had a classically<br />
inspired preference for the ‘eternal’ conception of God, which William Kneale<br />
traces back to Parmenides <strong>and</strong> Plato, but not to Aristotle, who was on the