National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
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e t w e e n “do u h e t I s m” A n d “cl o s e AIr su p p o rt”. th e ge r m A n AIr wA r do c t r I n e In wo r l d wA r II 101<br />
Britain also accepted the American recommendation, even though such a promise<br />
made by the <strong>British</strong> side seems weird in view of the Trenchard doctrine.<br />
Hitler’s reply was a lie since the first German act of war on 1 September was,<br />
by no means, the cannon fire launched from training ship “Schleswig-Holstein” on<br />
Gdansk’s Westerplatte at 04:47. Seven minutes earlier, at 04:40, the citizens of the<br />
small Polish town of Wielun had woken up startled by the sound of hurling sirens and<br />
explosions, engines humming above them and screaming to be heard. Dive-bombers<br />
of the German Air Force were bombing the town that had neither a military target<br />
nor industrial plants. Seventy percent of the small town was destroyed and 1,200 of<br />
its 16,000 inhabitants were killed. This aerial attack, killing children, adolescents,<br />
women and men in their sleep, served the purpose of testing new, stronger engines<br />
and bombs. Two days later, soldiers of the German Army came to record the effects<br />
of the attack, using measuring tape on the town’s building ruins. 44<br />
The next dive-bomber attacks on Warsaw supported the fact that the German<br />
side did not really wish to spare the Polish people the air war. Explaining the aerial<br />
attacks on the Polish capital on 10 September, the Air Force General Staff stated:<br />
“The attack should be viewed as retaliation <strong>for</strong> crimes committed against German<br />
soldiers. It is important to achieve extensive destruction in the densely populated<br />
parts of town during the first attack“. 45 Since admitting to having followed Douhet’s<br />
or Mitchell’s ideas was naturally not an option, the retaliation attack specified in<br />
German Air Force Regulation L.Dv. 16 was used as an explanation. Some days later,<br />
v. Richthofen, who had been seconded as an aviation commander <strong>for</strong> special duty to<br />
the 10th Army, requested sarcastically: „I urgently request that the last opportunity<br />
<strong>for</strong> a fire and terror attack be used as a large-scale test […] If aviation commander<br />
<strong>for</strong> special duty is tasked accordingly, all ef<strong>for</strong>ts will be made to completely wipe<br />
out Warsaw, the more so as there will only be a border customs office located there<br />
in the future“. 46 Though v. Richthofen was not given permission to launch such a terror<br />
attack, the Polish capital was not spared from almost complete destruction in the<br />
further course of the war. But with its area bombing of the town of Wielun right on<br />
the first day of World War II, the German Luftwaffe was the first air <strong>for</strong>ce of the warring<br />
factions to mount a Douhet-style terror attack, carrying out its first combat action.<br />
With this, the German Air Force actually started the bombing terror war, which<br />
returned to Germany – the party having caused it – only a few years after, sealing the<br />
fate of many German cities.<br />
Contrary to the doubts stated in Air Force Regulation L.Dv. 16, the war against<br />
Poland generally showed that, with German air superiority, the German Air Force<br />
44 Cf., Größte Härte…“ Verbrechen der Wehrmacht in Polen September/Oktober 1939. German Historical<br />
Institute Warsaw. Osnabrück 2005, p. 69-71.<br />
45 Cited in Olaf Groehler, Der strategische Luftkrieg und seine Auswirkungen auf die deutsche Zivilbevölkerung,<br />
in: Boog, Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (see Note 3), p. 332.<br />
46 Ibid., p. 334.