National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
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do u H e t o r n o t do u H e t. sw e d i sH air po w e r do C t r i n e in t H e 1930´s a n d 1940´s 297<br />
You then shoot down the crews. After severe losses also the remaining crews begin<br />
to loose their morale.”<br />
The big secret behind the <strong>British</strong> victory, the radar, was not totally detected by the<br />
Swedes, however they in their reports spoke about what they called “the radiolocation”,<br />
akind of echosystem in the air. Or as Axel Ljungdahl put it: “This was the first<br />
time the we ever heard the word ‘radar’, and we were highly astonished when we on<br />
the large operational map (in a combat leading centre) could se how German planes<br />
moved in France.” 12<br />
The impressions from the Battle of Britain were important <strong>for</strong> the development<br />
of anew Swedish Air Doctrine, but they shouldn´t be overestimated. The experiences<br />
from the first two years of the war, especially the Finnish Winter War and the German<br />
occupation of Denmark and Norway were as important. The shift in the Swedish<br />
Air Doctrine had already began be<strong>for</strong>e the Battle of Britain took place, but the<br />
speed and direction in that shift was increased after the <strong>British</strong> victory.<br />
Not all impulses came from Britain. Other important news about the development<br />
of Air technology, operational art and tactics also came from Moscow and to a larger<br />
extent from Berlin. Important visits by Swedish officers took place at the Luftwaffe<br />
both be<strong>for</strong>e and after the outbreak of the war. 13<br />
Among the most important news were the German way of co-operation between<br />
Air units and Army <strong>for</strong>ces in Close-Air-Support operations, as well as the system <strong>for</strong><br />
supplying the Air units, the Fliegerhorst-organisation. The later was introduced in<br />
Sweden in 1942 in <strong>for</strong>m of the so called “Air bases-areas”, a system that was strongly<br />
supported by the new (from 1942) CIC of the Air Force, Bengt Nordenskiöld. 14<br />
The report written by Ljungdahl and Hägglöf from their visit in Britain in November<br />
1941 gave a good push to the work on a Swedish radar construction, a work<br />
that had been going on since 1939. The work included several high-tech industries<br />
like Bo<strong>for</strong>s, SAAB and L M Ericsson and during 1944 radar was introduced both<br />
in the anti-aircraft artillery and the Air Force. In 1944 Britain also revealed some<br />
important radar secrets to Sweden, as a gratitude since Sweden to the <strong>British</strong> had<br />
handed over some German V 2-bombs that had landed by mistake in Sweden. During<br />
the large manoeuvre with the fighter Squadron in September 1944 radar was used<br />
<strong>for</strong> the first time inn Sweden to support operational control of the fighters from the<br />
operational control room on the ground.<br />
12<br />
Axel Ljungdahl, En flygofficers minnen (In Swedish: The memories of an Air Force officer), Stockholm<br />
1972 pp. 147-148.<br />
13<br />
Klaus-Richard Böhme, Kontakter med en tänkbar angripare. Flygvapnet och Luftwaffe 1935-1939<br />
(In English: Contacts with a potential aggressor. The Air Force and the Luftwaffe 1935-1939), in<br />
Militärhistorisk Tidskrift 1989 (<strong>Military</strong> <strong>History</strong> Review 1989) pp. 223-249 and Gunnar Richardson,<br />
Beundran och fruktan. Sverige inför Tyskland 1940-1942 (In English: Admiration and fear. Sweden<br />
in front of Germany 1940-1942), Stockholm 1996 pp. 35-38.<br />
14<br />
Norberg 1971 pp. 204-205.