National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

tH e pl a C e o f do u H e t: a reassessment 107
Italian (specifically Caproni) inspired, no historian has cared to examine the possibility
that the British concept of strategic bombardment was - if not Italian inspired
- than Italian influenced. Indeed, the scale of the Italian bombing campaign (which
was very considerable, dwarfing the British and German campaigns) is almost totally
unappreciated in Britain today - despite the fact that the Italian strategic bombing
campaign was the first in history.
At the end of July 1915, Douhet had proposed the creation of a force of 500
Caproni bombers to mount a sustained strategic bombing campaign against Austrian
communications, ports and industries. And, although Douhet’s proposal was officially
turned down (despite Caproni’s enthusiastic support), within three weeks the
Italians had embarked on just such a campaign - albeit in a limited fashion initially.
The campaign reached its height in the late summer of 1917, with repeated and devastating
attacks by large numbers of Capronis on the Adriatic port of Pola, HQ of the
Austrian Navy.
Italian aviation, and in particular the Italian strategic bombing campaign, were
given extensive and admiring coverage in the US and British newspapers and aviation
journals of the day - the bombing campaign right from its inception. During
the war, all the major Italian achievements in the air were fully reported and widely
discussed in Britain e.g. Laureati’s epic non-stop flight from Turin to London, the
daring attack on Cattaro, D’Annunzio’s audacious daylight flight over Vienna and,
of course, the massed raids on Pola.
During the war, the Rome correspondents of the “Times” (William McClure),
the “Daily Mail” (G. Ward Price) and the “Morning Post” (William Miller) all wrote
many interesting and informative articles about Italian aviation, and especially its
long-range bombing operations e.g. McClure’s article “Italian progress in the air”
(Sept. 1917). McClure (who also had the distinction of being Chief Correspondent
with the Italian armies during the war) was closely connected with Italian aviation
circles, and had been ever since he had accompanied the Italian forces during the
fighting in Libya. After he left the “Times” in 1920, McClure joined the British
Embassy in Rome as Press Officer, and remained there until his death in 1939. Is it
conceivable that McClure was not aware of Douhet’s writings? And if he was aware,
is it likely that he would have kept such knowledge to himself? His fellow correspondent
William Miller was a close friend and adviser of Hoare during the latter’s
wartime service in Italy.
It is now hard to appreciate that, during WWI, Italian aviation was widely regarded,
in Britain and the US especially, as leading the world - principally because
of its strategic bombing campaign. FW Lanchester (a leading and influential British
airpower theorist), looking back on the Italian’s spectacular long-range bombing
successes of summer 1917, wrote in the magazine “Flying”: “The Italian Air Service
was very much to the front on the question of bombing, and had been advertised
the world over by the exploits of the big Caproni machine. There were many who
believed that the Italians were really ahead on the strength of this”.