National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

do u H e t o r n o t do u H e t. sw e d i sH air po w e r do C t r i n e in t H e 1930´s a n d 1940´s 295
It´s interesting that the douhetism was more widespread among the politicians
in the parliament than among the Air Force officers themselves. The Air Force had
argued for another fighter wing and one reconnaissance wing. But these demands
were rejected by the politicians for financial reasons. What we can call the “bomber
lobby” was strong eithin the parliament. If the demands of the Air Forces had been
followed, the proportions between bombers and fighters would have been 2:1, i.e.
exactly the same proportions as in the British RAF, the foreign force that had given
the largest impulses to Sweden. 9
This resulted in a bomber force proportionally – but of course not in quantity
– larger than in most European countries, but this is not the same as to say that the
Swedish Air Force rejected the use of fighters, quite the opposite. The leading men in
the Force were of course very much aaware of the fact that the proportions between
bombers and fighters were – as I all fields of military activities – depending upon the
race between offensive and defensive weapons. One can also note that the CIC in
person, from his very first year in office showed a large interest in both Swedish and
foreign fighterplane constructions.
In the spring of 1939, with only some moths left to the outbreak of the war, the
Swedish Air Force counted two bomber wings (F1 and F 4), two reconnaissance
wings (F 2 and F 3) and one fighter wing (F 8 close to Stockholm). The two other
bomber wings decided by the Parliament in 1936 were established on July 1, 1939 (F
6) and in 1940 (F 7). In total the Air Force could muster some 195 planes in September
1939, but for different reasons (especially lack of spare parts and modern propellers)
only 134 of these were operational. Therefore Torsten Friis when the war broke
out could only send 47 bombers and 33 fighters in the air. However these figures are
disputed among scholars, and they should be regarded as minimum figures.
The first year of the war underlined the importance of having a strong Air Force
to protect the mobilization as well as cities, industries and communications. During
the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union, Sweden in January 1940 sent
a wing (F 19) with four bombers and twelve fighters to support Finland. The creation
of this volunteer unit ment that one third of Torsten Friis operational fighters were
sent to Finland. This was the only time, together with the UN-operations in Congo
1960-64, that the Swedish Air Force had been taken part in war operations. 10
The experiences from the winter war were important, but they also showed how
vulnerable the relatively small Swedish Air Force was. The parliament in 1940 decided
to create two more fighter wings and one reconnaissance wings. The first,
9 For the debate about how to count these proportions see Norberg 1971 pp. 225 note 30 and Klaus-
Richard Böhme, “Review of Norberg” 1971, in “Historisk Tidskrift” (Historical Review) 1972:2 p.
302.
10 For F 19 see Göran Andolf, Svenska frivilligkåren (In English: The Swedish Volunteer Corps), in
Svenska frivilliga i Finland 1939-1944 (In English: Swedish Volunteers in Finland, 1939-1944),
Stockholm 1989 pp. 39-190, especially pp. 176-187.