National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

350 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
American and Coalition airpower, which was overwhelmingly American airpower
when counting sorties and bombs dropped, demonstrated what modern air forces
armed with stealth, precision, and superior C2 could do against even a well-equipped
enemy. In a six week air campaign that preceded the Coalition ground assault, the
Iraqi air defense were first taken down, then key leadership and command and control
targets were destroyed. Finally, the elite units of the Iraqi army were systematically
targeted and heavily attritted. By the end of the air campaign, the Iraqi forces were
demoralized they had lost much of the fighting power. When finally unleashed, the
ground forces needed only four days to overwhelm the huge Iraqi army. 43
Warden’s ideas and the group of airpower planners he led in the Pentagon had
great influence over the air war plan in 1991. Many can rightly argue that the key
concepts expressed by Warden are very close to the traditions of the Air Corps Tactical
School. 44 The question was whether the airpower success in Iraq in 1991 signified
a true revolution in military affairs in which airpower now plays the key role in applying
military force, or the product of a set of unusually favorable circumstances.
The NATO air campaign against Kosovo in the 1999 was an instance of defeating
a nation using air power alone. But the victory came only after a frustrating 78day
campaign and the goals of the campaign were very limited, Serbian withdrawal
from the Province of Kosovo. In fact, the 1999 campaign demonstrated many flaws
in the NATO and American application of airpower. As a coalition operation there
were serious difficulties in developing a united strategy. Partner air forces found it
difficult to operate alongside the Americans because other NATO nations had not
invested in precision munitions or modern C2 systems. In the biggest air campaign
since the Gulf War, it was still not clear that a true revolution had occurred. 45 Still,
the most impressive feature of the campaign was the American capability to strike
targets precisely.
In 2001 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy proved
exceptionally capable in fighting against conventional enemies with little or no airpower.
With huge technological advantages American airpower managed to cripple
and destroy whole Iraqi divisions before they even reached the front. 46 Moreover,
they did so with such precise effects that civilian casualties and damage to the civilian
infrastructure was minimal.
At the dawn of the 21st Century the U.S. Air Force and Navy have such a techno-
43
The best critical history of the Air War of 1991 is Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen, Revolution in
Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993).
44
See David Mets, The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists (Maxwell
AFB: Air University Press, 1999).
45
An excellent critical analysis of this campaign is Tony Mason, Operation Allied Force, 1999 in A
History of Air Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2010) pp. 225-
252.
46
See Williamson Murray, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 in A History of Air Warfare, pp. 279-296.