National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
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In c o n c l u s I v e e x p e r I m e n t – brItIsh AIr po w e r A n d t h e su e z crIsIs, 1956. th e Al l I e d AIr cA m pA I g n reAssessed 67<br />
concentrated along the Desert Road leading to Cairo relatively quickly. A good port<br />
would be needed to carry out the vast maintenance plan <strong>for</strong> some 77,000 men and<br />
11,000 vehicles. 39 The political advantage, of course, was that Alexandria offered<br />
an option to strike directly into the seat of Nasser’s power. According to the <strong>British</strong><br />
calculations, the Egyptians would defend their capital. By luring them into fighting<br />
a repetition of the battle of the Pyramids, the main elements of the Egyptian army<br />
could be annihilated.<br />
The concept was refined into a plan by the end of August – the preliminary D-Day<br />
being in mid-September. The plan – that can be characterised as safe and traditional,<br />
yet in full harmony with existing amphibious doctrine – included five subsequent<br />
phases: movements, rapid neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force, amphibious and<br />
airborne assaults to gain a bridgehead, consolidation of the bridgehead and finally<br />
operations towards Cairo. 40<br />
The <strong>British</strong> were acquainted with the Egyptian base system – they were of course,<br />
constructed earlier by the <strong>British</strong>. The Egyptian Air Force was estimated to consist<br />
of some 300 combat planes including some 80 Mig-15 fighters and 45 IL-28 light<br />
bombers, most others being more or less obsolete types. 41 According to intelligence<br />
estimates, the Egyptians were still in a transition phase with their new equipment and<br />
not able to operate them efficiently until the end of 1956. Even after that operations<br />
would be hampered because of a primitive ground control system. 42<br />
Air Marshall Barnett estimated that it would take between 2-3 days to neutralise<br />
the Egyptian Air Force. Although the idea of a single surprise air attack just prior to<br />
the landings was considered amongst some planners, it was found not practicable.<br />
There were not enough planes to destroy the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and to<br />
execute and support airborne landings simultaneously. 43 Due to the lack of an original<br />
overall air plan <strong>for</strong> the Alexandria option, the details of consequent air operations<br />
can only be guessed. Presumably, they were directed to support the assault <strong>for</strong>ces, to<br />
isolate the battle area and to destroy Egyptian military targets in depth in accordance<br />
with the doctrine.<br />
For the active operations, the Allied order of battle included over 500 aircraft.<br />
The number of planes fluctuated during the tedious planning process but the<br />
39 NA WO 32/16320, War Office, QM (3), 17 August 1956, ”Maintenance Plan <strong>for</strong> Operation Musketeer”<br />
and SHD 8 S 274, Etat-Major des Forces Armeés, 1618/EMFA/3. B.T.M.A/12 Avril 1957, “Les<br />
Transports de L’operation 700”.<br />
40 NA WO 288/91, HQ Allied Task Force, 29 August 1956, “Allied Land Force Operation Order No 1”.<br />
41 NA AIR 20/9554, HQ Air Task Force, ATF/TS.175/56, October 1956, “Overall Air Plan (Winter) <strong>for</strong><br />
Operation Musketeer”.<br />
42 NA CAB 158/24, JIC (56) 33, 28 February 1956, “Egyptian Effectiveness in the Use of Soviet Air-<br />
craft”.<br />
43 Imperial War Museum, Department of Books and Documents, Papers of Air Chief Marshall Sir<br />
Denis Barnett (96/10/1), Barnett to the COS-Committee, 9 August 1956 and NA AIR 20/9961,<br />
Squadron Leader Penred to Senior Air Staff Officer, AHQL 612/TS/Plans, 17 August 1956.