National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

242 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
sions, using the C-47, DO-27, and Fiat G91 equipped differently, which allowed
various updated mosaics of the area of operations, according to operational needs
and at a very short notice. The exploitation of information reports from Commander
in Chief Headquarters upon this mosaic facilitated identification of suspect places
then confirmed by visual reconnaissance. This process allowed the elaboration of a
credible set of target folders and an up to date order of battle. The visual reconnaissance
was, whenever possible, done systematically, following a plan, without direct
association to the launching of specific operations, or it was executed in accordance
with operational specific demands to confirm intelligence notices.
Beyond the reconnaissance and independent attack, the air means were used in
direct support to ground forces, and in support for populations by means of transport
and medical evacuation. For example the concentration of pilgrims to Mecca was
made in BA12, every year, for transport from the various places of the province by
military aircraft, from which they left on commercial flights.
The guerrillas, who were well armed and disciplined, and had a high operational
capacity for their mission, often acted in a much concealed way through ambushes,
attacks on barracks, usually at a distance with artillery, and attacks against military
forces nearby and against populations that did not follow them. The most important
of the guerrilla bases were located outside, near the border, constituting themselves
as sanctuaries. On rare occasions the enemy acted almost in conventional form; in
these circumstances they were very exposed to the air action, particularly in areas
with lower forest cover.
In every theatre of operations air dominance was absolute, in the way that the
guerrillas did not have air assets. However, since the beginning the guerrillas sought
to counter the aerial action through anti-aircraft artillery.
In Guinea, there were several stages in the mode of anti-aircraft action. At first it
was done by shooting indiscriminately against all the military airplanes (there was
one case or another against civil aircraft), with individual weapons. Next came the
7.62 m/m weapons placed on a tripod. After came the guns with 12.7 m/m. The first
were only effective in short distances, when the aircraft was spotted and flew at low
altitude. The latter produced greater effects but were easily visible from the air, as
it usually was located in clearings and firing was visible from the air with relative
ease. Following this initial period when it seemed that all weapons were still pointed
at aircraft, an absence of any anti-aircraft activity was noted in the whole theatre
which could have been a result of general directives to avoid the detection of presence
of the guerrillas on the ground. After that, the guerrillas adopted more powerful
weapons, the ZPU-4 Soviet 14.5 m/m, placed in appropriate gun emplacements in
areas where they intended to demonstrate its impregnability – including air space
impregnability – it is unlikely that such demonstration would have produced the
desired results in spite of enemy propaganda saying the opposite, since such deployment
remained vulnerable, because it was easily spotted and could be subject to air
attack. Along this period various aircraft were hit, including its crews but none a fatal