National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

do C t r i n e, Ca pa C i t i e s, te C H n o l o g y a n d o p e r at i o n a l en v i r o n m e n t o n t H e em p l o y m e n t o f t H e air po w e r ; t H e Ca s e o f guerrilla wa r fa r e 245
Freixo 2500 m; Porto Amelia 1800 m; Quelimane 1800 m; Tete 2500 m; Vila Cabral
2000 m), and more than 200 runways longer than 700 meters distributed throughout
the territory.
The enemy had anti-aircraft artillery calibre 12.7 m/m, more concentrated in the
Maconde plateau. In 1965 they hit 5 DO, 8 T6 and 1 Auster; in 1966 7 DO, 8 T6, 1
Auster, 1 Nord and 1 PV2; in 1967 they hit 14 T6, including one shot with the pilot
and in 1972 5 DO-27, 11 T6 including 2 shot down, 11 AL III which resulted in the
death of a pilot and a mechanic and four pilots wounded, 2 G91and 3 Nord; in 1973
7 G-91, 3 C47 which resulted in the death of a radioman, 5 Nord, 11 DO-27, 3 T6, 10
AL III which resulted in the death of one pilot and two gunners, two pilots injured,
and a C47. In the first half of 1974 they hit 11 DO-27, 3 T6, 10 AL III with death of
a pilot and two gunners and two pilots injured. The acquisition of missile Strella did
not produce the results obtained in Guinea, fundamentally because it was no surprise
and the appropriate countermeasures had already been introduced. The worst case
was that of the C-47 hit that managed to land on an emergency airfield. The aircraft
was carrying foreign military attachés visiting the theatre of operations.
Air operations took place along the lines of the other theatres. The great distances
between the Operational Command, the base units and areas of operations naturally
hampered the coordination of air activity and cooperation with ground forces, consuming
lots of flight hours in transit.
Some principles concerning the use of airpower
in counter guerrilla
The preceding description aimed to support some conclusions about the use of
airpower in war against guerrillas from a concrete experience.
The idea of a system, with the aircraft and the air mission in its centre, should
be present in any form of employment of airpower, including counter guerrilla war.
Given the continued dependency of the aircraft in infrastructures in the theatre, the
first concern of those responsible for planning should be the creation of the conditions
that would allow air operation in satisfactory safety conditions. The efficiency
of the air power will be much dependent on the points of support in ground that will
to be granted in the air operations.
The counter guerrilla war is a war of lassitude that takes so much time; it can not
be solved in short term and will consume a lot of resources. As this type of war take
place in remote sites, generally, the principle of sustainability should be present in a
realistic view, which means availability of the necessary resources in time, readiness
of operational assets, proper qualification of personnel being ready to work in the
real environment, updated doctrine. In the Portuguese case a very flexible organization
was put in place oriented to the concrete aspects of the mission, and some
operational centres were build in the rearguard to prepare the pilots, the technicians,