National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

70 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
The new concept was met with mixed feelings and it divided the opinion of
planners at all levels. The criticism, which continued until the execution of the
operations centred on three factors:
1. How to reliably predict the collapse of the Egyptian will and moral? Would
the Egyptian people rise against Nasser?
2. How long should the Allies continue the bombing offensive to achieve the
breaking point?
3.
Would the British and French governments withstand international pressure to
cease hostilities during a prolonged air offensive?
In spite of the criticism, the concept was accepted and finally developed into a
plan. It was supported at least by the Chairman of the COS-committee, Chief Air
Marshall William Dickson; the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Dermont Boyle and
by the Minister of Defence, Walter Monckton, who had a sceptical view on the use of
force throughout the autumn. 50 According to Rhodes James, the change of plan was
an unpleasant surprise for Prime Minister Anthony Eden. 51 He was not convinced
of the new concept even after a private conference with General Keightley. Yet, he
chose not to oppose his senior military advisers and the new concept was accepted
by the Egypt Committee on 10 September. 52
The air offensive was based on an assumption that the Egyptian will would to
collapse. But how to produce a reliable assessment of their morale? The British
– nor the French – did not have an adequate answer to this fundamental question.
The views of the service intelligence agencies were not unanimous, though the
Egyptians were in general thought to be lower category opponents in the face of
the modern war machine. 53 The Joint Intelligence Committee54 , responsible for the
co-ordination of the British intelligence community, produced a surprisingly spare
amount of documents during the crisis and it is not known whether the reports of the
British ambassador suggesting heavy resistance were delivered to the Task Force
Commanders. 55
The overall intelligence arrangements were subjected to criticism after the
crisis was over. The Task Force Commanders were unsatisfied with the flow of
50
On Monckton’s views on the use of force, see, e.g., Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956, A Personal Account
(London: Book Club Associates, 1978) p. 133 and Anthony Nutting, No End of A Lesson, (London:
Constable & Company Ltd., 1967), pp. 106-107.
51
James Rhodes, Anthony Eden (London: Weidenweld and Nicholson, 1986), pp. 508-509.
52
Jonathan Pearson, Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis. Reluctant Gamble (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2003), pp. 68-69.
53
NA ADM 116/6137, The Director of Naval Intelligence to the First Sea Lord, 25 September 1956
and WO 288/98, G(Int) HQ 2 Corps, 19 August 1956, “An Estimation of Probable Egyptian Reactions
to Present Threat”.
54
For the composition and tasks of the committee, see NA CAB 158/39, JIC (57) 123, 29 November
1957.
55
NA AIR 20/9229, JIC (ME) “Bi-Weekly Intelligence Review No 10”, 27 September 1956.