National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

60 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
the contemporary doctrine linking the operational peacetime principles of peacetime
training and wartime action, as the Royal Air Force War Manual published in 1950,
the contemporary doctrine of the Royal Air Force, put the matter. 4
The article focuses almost entirely on the British part of the operation. The French
participation is consciously left on the sidetrack, but not because their participation
is uninteresting. On the contrary, the French possessed some extremely exiting
and modern concepts worth of further research such as airborne and psychological
operations or tactical employment of ultra modern 7 Division Mécanique Rapide.
However, L’Armée de l’Air did not have a doctrine or the resources to conduct
strategic air operations that are the main focus of this article.
Strike Hard, Strike Sure – the Principles of British Air Power
“Allied Air Power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably
suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects.
Nevertheless it was decisive” 5
It is no coincidence that John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, a former
Chief of Air Staff and a well known protagonist of air power, quoted the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey in his 1954 book Strategy for the West. In the
absence of missiles, Britain’s forthcoming nuclear deterrence was to be based on the
Royal Air Force. The RAF was to become the primary arm since it was to deliver
Britain’s nuclear inventory if deterrence failed.
During the Suez Crisis, air power was to play a predominant role in the Allied
attack plans. To understand the background for the decisions made in these plans, it is
relevant to review the ideas of aerial warfare that prevailed at the time in the United
Kingdom. The tactics introduced during the Second World War still prevailed in the
British Army. But did the lessons of the war provide an empirical basis also for the
Royal Air Force in the mid-1950s? Had the role of air forces changed since the Second
World War? What were the principles of applying air power in a Limited War?
The basic foundations of the air force doctrine originated from a holistic
understanding of a country’s capacity to wage war. According to the Royal Air Force
War Manual, the war potential of the enemy consisted of various factors such as
the armed forces, morale, industrial and economic capacity, scientific research and
manpower. Most of the physical manifestations of these factors were located inside
enemy territory. This led to the logical conclusion that “the basic weapon of the air
force is the bomber and the basic strategy of Air Power must be offensive”. 6
4 Royal Air Force War Manual, Operations (AP 1300, 1950), introduction.
5 John Slessor, Strategy for the West (London: Cassell & Co, 1954), p. 96. Originally quoted in the
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report (European War), September 30, 1945,
(Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 107.
6 Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations (Air Ministry, 1950), pp. 2-5, 19.