National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

298 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
During these years of shift of Air doctrine the Swedish Air Force also steadily
grew in number. In 1945 the Air Force consisted of 17 wings, seven bombers, seven
fighters and three reconnaissance, and every unit had more, and also more modern,
planes than in 1939. The CIC Bengt Nordenskiöld could muster a little more than
1 000 planes when the war ended in Europe in May 1945.
The changes in the Swedish Air Force doctrine in the years after 1936 was partly
due to technical changes, partly to experiences of the war since 1939. In the first
years of the 1940´s there wasn´t, of course, any realistic possibilities for the Swedish
bomber wings to attack the Soviet or German air bases, not to speak about attacking
Soviet or German cities in order to prevent attacks against similar targets in Sweden.
The thought of using bombers to prevent bombing of Swedish cities and industries
was already history.
Instead the bomber wing should be used the enemy invasionfleet or army units
crossing the Swedish border. However, in the dramatic morning of June 22, 1941,
when Nazi-Germany launched it´s massive invasion of Soviet Russia, bombers of
the 1st bomber wing at Västerås air base were put on alert. In case of a Soviet attack
their task would have been to try to attack invasions ships and, if possible, harbours
in the Sovietockupied Estonia. 15
A defence commission suggested in 1941 the establishment of as many fighter
wings as bomber wings (six of each), and it argued for a closer cooperation between
the Air Force, the Army and the Navy: “The fighter units shall have enough capacity
to make an efficient protection for the own air forces in the air and on the ground,
the army forces and their communications, the naval forces in harbour and close to
the coasts and, finally, to the populated areas. These units are, together with mobile
troops, the most important weapon against an enemy invasion.”
This was postulated in January 1942 and marks the end of the bomber epoch
in Swedish Air Force doctrine. The attempts by the Air Force to create a kind of
strategic bomber force came to an end, and instead the Force began to develop tactical
bombers (for CAS-missions), fighters and the new attack planes, light and fast
planes aimed for attacking the invasion fleet. This shift in the doctrine also ment that
the Air Force came to work more close to the other two branches of the armed forces.
A strong strategic bomber force could operate more independent than the tactical
and attack forces that now began to dominate the agenda. The most clear expression
for this shift in doctrine was the creation of the “Attack squadron”, the main mobile
striking tool to be used by the CIC of the armed forces in case on an enemy invasion
throughout the cold war.
15 Lars Ericson (Wolke), Buffert eller hot? De baltiska staterna i svensk militär planering år 1941 (In
English: Buffert or threat? The Baltic states in Swedish military planning in 1941), in Bo Hugemark,
ed., I orkanens öga. 1941 – osäker neutralitet (In English: In the eye of the hurricane. 1941 – uncertain
neutrality), Stockholm 1992 pp. 127-154, especially pp. 138-141.