National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

In t r o d u c t I o n • Av I At I o n A n d te c h n o l o g I c A l su p e r I o r I t y between new co n f l I c t s A n d dI p l o m A c y 31
maritime power as a foreign policy’s instrument, in particular in the field «of deterrence
and compellence, therefore of “coercive diplomacy”», and that «the politics
“of bombers” … has largely replaced that “of gunboats”» 21 .
Airpower’s advantages are «rapidity of intervention, the wide range of action,
…, the “verticality”, which frees air attacks from the territory’s morphological constraints,
the possibility of graduating violence according to the political needs and
the enemy’s reactions, the freeing of air attacks from the media’s pervasive influence
before they take place … aircrafts guarantee a virtual power, without deploying
forces in the field or in the seas near the theatre of operation» 22 . Yet this same author
remarks that «maritime superiority, thanks to its ubiquity, mobility, flexibility and
now thanks also to cruise missiles aboard and amphibious operations, is certainly
a very relevant tool of the diplomacy of violence for surgical interventions worldwide.
In this role naval forces have competitive assets in respects to air forces» 23 .
Fleets cruising international waters for example may allow naval aviation to strike
its targets without recurring to bases in friendly foreign territories and without asking
other States to use their airspace 24 .
Aircrafts and missiles may be employed for the “surgical” elimination of terrorists
and “mad” dictators, even if in Osama Bin Laden’s case the operation was performed
by a landed commando. The operations of aerial interdiction, imposing no
flight zones, staged in the Balkans, in Iraq and in Libya, are a complement of naval
blockades and are more effective when it’s necessary to prevent the violent repression
of insurgents and ethnic minorities.
Airpower and maritime power will always have their supporters, convinced that
the former or the latter is the most important; as already remarked, military interventions
to foster stable political solutions usually require land troops. The employment
of military force more than ever requires a joint and combined approach and is also
preferable that it enjoys a wide consensus by the international community, since no
State (at least in the West) still possesses alone the material, ethic and political resources
for solitary interventions.
21
C. M. Santoro, Potere aereo, deterrenza e compellenza e C. Jean, Osservazioni sul potere aereo, in
C. M. Santoro (ed.), Italo Balbo: aviazione e potere aereo, Roma, 1998, pp. 229-50 (243 and 248
for the quotations).
22
C. Jean, Guerra, Strategia e Sicurezza, Roma-Bari, 1997, pp. 148-49.
23
Ibi, p. 143.
24
In 1973 during the Yom Kippur war, in any case the United States, for their intervention in support
of Israel, didn’t ask their European allies, with the exception of Portugal, the use of airspace and
bases, maybe fearing a refusal. The use of bases in Western Germany, the only employed besides the
Portuguese ones, aroused the annoyance of the Bonn government, which had not been informed.