National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

76 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
Due to international pressure to bring the hostilities to a quick end, the landings at
Port Said were decided to be carried out on an accelerated timetable. The main assault
force was not available as it was still sailing in several convoys from Malta. It was
decided to push up the parachute landings. They were to take place on the morning
of 5 November, about 24 hours before the amphibious assault was to take place. 81
The parachute landings took place in accordance with the plans. The emphasis of the
air campaign shifted to from indirect support to direct support of the land campaign.
The naval aircraft took the main burden for this phase by carrying out most of the
several hundred sorties against local defences and by providing successful CabRank
for the parachute force and the seaborne assault force landing on 6 November. 82 It
was not the lack of air support, but the lack of political support – feared by the Joint
Planning Staff from the beginning – that halted the campaign during the same day
the successful seaborne attack was carried out.
Conclusions
The concept, and subsequent plan, of destroying the Egyptian will to fight through
air action creates mixed feelings. The targeting of the air offensive was done in
accordance with the experiences of the Second World War. Communications and oil
were found to be what would today be called “centres of gravity”. It is safe to presume
that the destruction of the communications and oil would have caused severe troubles
for the Egyptians. But were they the real centre of gravity? Would the mechanical
destruction of means to move cause the collapse of the entire Egyptian morale? Were
the fundamentals of presuming a rapid collapse of the Egyptian resistance sound?
We shall never know the exact answer because the prolonged air campaign was not
carried out in accordance with the original concept. Yet, the British were very well
aware of the facts because of their experiences during the Second World War. The
German will was never crushed by aerial bombardment and neither was the British
moral destroyed during the Blitz. Was the poor performance of the Egyptian Armed
Forces in the 1948 war against Israel one of the facts that lead to underestimainge the
Egyptians? Perhaps so, but there were also voices stressing the unity of the Egyptian
people. Apparently – as this has taken place several times since the Suez Crisis – it
is very easy to underestimate the morale of your opponent, especially if he does not
possess your technology or way of life.
It is also apparent, that the British overestimated the capabilities of the Bomber
Command. Bombing techniques as well as equipment did not enable the precision
bombing required to destroy the targets, especially in the darkness. The need to
81
NA WO 288/91, Headquarters Allied Task Force, 4 November 1956, “Allied Land Force Operation
Instruction No 7”.
82
NA AIR 14/4441, Bomber Command, Operational Research Branch, Report number 355: “Bombing
and Ground Attack Operations during Operation Musketeer”.