National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

72 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
potential to attack three congested Allied airfields at Cyprus. Operations of the
Bomber Command squadrons, aimed at rendering the airfields unusable, would take
place only during the night. After that ground attack planes attacking at the first light
would destroy the enemy planes on the ground. The ground attack planes on the
carriers would operate at maximum rates to take advantage of their relatively short
distance from the targets and limited endurance of the Carrier Group. 60
Phase two was the core of the air offensive. The planners realised that “No precise
estimate can be given as to the length of this phase” but preparations were made for
30 days. 61 The plan was based on the destruction of oil facilities and communications.
The Joint Intelligence Bureau, an agency specialised on economic intelligence,
produced a study on the Egyptian oil facilities and transportation system. According
to the study, the destruction of the bulk capacity would leave the Egyptians with oil
only for a few weeks. Attacks on the distribution system would only enhance the
effect. 62 An earlier study produced in the beginning of August, indicated that an oil
denial operation was feasible if the storage system was subjected to low level attacks
by both bombers and ground attack planes. 63
The infrastructure of communications was well known to the British. It was based
on the railway network. According to another study by the Joint Intelligence Bureau,
air attacks against railways, especially against bridges, would paralyse most of the
domestic cargo as well as passenger traffic. 64
The targeting was co-ordinated by a special Targets Committee chaired by
General Keightley himself. By mid-September the amount of bridges in the target
lists had fallen from twenty to eight. Effort to prevent the Egyptians movement was,
however, to be boosted by a vigorous interdiction programme. The sites of bridges
were to be subjected to strafing by ground attack planes and armed reconnaissance
along major roads would accomplish the interdictions. 65 The amount of transport
targets decreased and by October only two bridges remained in the target lists –
eventually both of them were spared. There are at least three reasons for this. Likely,
the long-term damage was considered to be too extensive. Secondly, the Anglo-
French land forces advancing along the Canal could face problems if the damage to
the bridges was too extensive. The third reason is practical. At the time before guided
munitions, bridges were extremely hard targets to destroy. According to an estimate,
the destruction of 11 bridges would take some 500 sorties by Canberra light bombers
with 3-ton bomb loads if the bombing error was some 100 yards. Bombing errors
60
TNA AIR 24/2426, Air Task Force/TS 287/56, 27 November 1956, “Report on Operation Musketeer”.
61
Ibid.
62
NA WO 288/162, JIB, 8 September 1956, “Vulnerability of Egyptian Oil”.
63
NA 20/10601, “The Feasibility of Disrupting Egypt’s Oil Supplies by Bombing”, A note by the Air
Ministry, 3 August 1956.
64
NA WO 288/162, JIB, 8 September 1956, “Vulnerability of Egyptian Transportation System”.
65
NA AIR 20/9583, SD 12, 24 September 1956, “Operation Musketeer: Outline of Air Plan”.