National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

64 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
situation in the theatre of war. The principles for using offensive air power would
be very similar to those mentioned earlier. Interdiction operations, 26 which meant
constant and concentrated attacks on transportation targets, would be aimed at
depriving the enemy of his freedom of movement. The intensive air offensive would
limit the opponent’s options for transferring strategic or tactical reserves into the
combat zone. During the preparatory phase, while the invasion force was loading and
at sea, the air force was to concentrate its efforts on the area around the landing area,
striking targets such as the landing beaches or tactical reserves. In the final phase the
main task of the air force would be to neutralise the local defences and to isolate the
beachhead. The role of the air force would be emphasised during the assault phase
due to the army’s lack of long-range weapon systems. The air force would therefore
make a general exception to the rule that aircraft should not be assigned to directly
support the ground forces. In practice, this would mean using ground attack planes in
close air support tasks such as neutralization of the beach defences, help for assault
troops involved in close-range fighting for the bridgehead, and transport support by
dropping or carrying supplies to the bridgehead. 27
If the landings were to take place outside the effective range of Royal Air
Force bases as they partially did in 1956, the assault carrier groups would assume
a more important role. The principles involved in employing carrier-borne aircraft
were not radically different from those for land-based units. The concentration of
air effort was the governing principle for employing carrier-borne aircraft as well.
The combined force of all aircraft carriers belonging to the assault group was to be
used simultaneously. However, the reason for this mainly stemmed from maritime
requirements such as the protection of the carrier group, which required complex
manoeuvres by the destroyers in the anti-submarine screen. 28
In an ideal scenario, a relatively vulnerable carrier group force would be used
only after the enemy air force was depleted by a strategic air offensive. Otherwise,
a Carrier Group Commander would be compelled to allocation a large proportion of
his air effort to protecting the carrier force from the hostile air force. When this factor
was combined with unpredictable weather and the requirement to replenish supplies
approximately every five days, the carrier air effort could be significantly reduced. 29
The employment of Fleet Air Arm squadrons could not compensate for the
26
Interdiction was defined as “the disruption of the enemy’s communication system with the object of
restricting his powers of movement”, A Precis of Lectures by the Land/Air Warfare Training Team,
Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (Stationary Service RAOC, BAOR, 1953), p. 2.
27
Amphibious Warfare Handbook No.8 A, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious Warfare,
1952. (Admirality No. CB4555, 1952), pp. 2-4.
28
Amphibious Warfare Handbook No.8 A, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious Warfare, pp.
8-9.
29
Amphibious Warfare Handbook No.8 A, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious Warfare, pp.
10-11.