National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

e t w e e n “do u h e t I s m” A n d “cl o s e AIr su p p o rt”. th e ge r m A n AIr wA r do c t r I n e In wo r l d wA r II 95
strong air force as an independent Service.
An air force equipped with approximately 390 long-range, four-engine bombers
with a capacity of 2000 kg of explosive, incendiary and gas bombs – the latter had by
the way already been demanded by Douhet – would reduce the enemy’s eagerness to
attack since by means of such aircraft a war could immediately be conducted in his
own center. Furthermore, the memorandum read: “Inflicting bomb terror on enemy
capitals or industrial areas will result in moral collapse the faster the weaker the
national attitude of the people and the more the metropolitan masses are oriented towards
materialism and divided by social and political conflicts”. To gain Germany’s
air superiority in Central Europe as fast as possible, Knauss recommended that the
air force be augmented at the expense of naval armaments projects; after all, an air
force equipped with 400 “large bomber aircraft” could be built with the means required
for the construction of two armored cruisers. In addition to bomber aircraft,
Knauss also demanded reconnaissance aircraft while fighter aircraft, in his opinion,
had no operational functions; he assigned them only operations in support of army
and naval forces.
This was clear evidence of the influence of Douhet’s doctrine, but Reich Minister
of War Werner v. Blomberg, in a directive dating 16 August 1933, pointed out that he
by no means intended to set up a “strategic air force”. The aim rather was to set up an
“operational air force” that in the event of a European multi-front war would have to
assume operational functions as part of a comprehensive strategy, either acting on its
own supported by patrol aircraft or interacting with army and naval forces. 25 Hence,
the pendulum rather swung towards an air force designed to support the Army.
On 26 February 1935, Hitler signed the decree on the foundation of the
Reichsluftwaffe, putting it as the third branch of the Wehrmacht on an equal footing
with Army and Navy and placing it under the command and control of Hermann
Göring as commander-in-chief. 26 On 09 March 1935, Hitler had Göring proclaim
officially that the German Reich was about to build up a German Air Force. In doing
so, the Reich was to make its contribution to peacekeeping, acting within the scope
of the Air Pact, which had been suggested by the Western powers. 27 A few days later,
during a solemn ceremony; Hitler gave the first fighter wing of the new German Air
Force the name of “Jagdgeschwader Richthofen”.
Despite this clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Western powers had
shown practically no reaction, thus encouraging Hitler to declare on 16 March 1935
that he was no longer willing to submit to the arms limitations set out by the Treaty
of Versailles. At the same time, he proclaimed the reintroduction of compulsory mili-
25 Cf. Deist, Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht (see Note 17), p. 484.
26 Cf. Rudolf Absolon, Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, Vol. 3, Boppard 1973, p. 177.
27 Karl-Heinz Völker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933-1939. Aufbau, Führung und Rüstung der Luftwaffe
und die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie (Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte. Militärgeschichtliches
Forschungsamt (ed.), Vol. 8). Stuttgart 1967, p. 68ff.