National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

tH e pl a C e o f do u H e t: a reassessment 113
was due in no small part to the personal relationship between Hoare and Balbo: the
two men greatly liked and admired each other.
For his part, Hoare (following his wartime service, a convinced Italophile) was
concerned not only to maintain but also to expand the long-standing ties between
British and Italian aviation. Hoare visited Italy several times during the mid 20s
(meeting Mussolini in 1925, who thanked him for helping the nascent Fascist Party)
and again, at Balbo’s invitation, in 1929. For his part, Balbo (an equally convinced
Anglophile) led an Italian air delegation (which included General Guidoni, recently
Air Attaché in London) on a tour of Britain in 1927. Warmly welcomed by Hoare
and Trenchard, they were feted everywhere they went. They visited the Hendon air
display, Cranwell, the Royal Aeronautical Society and the factories of leading aircraft
manufacturers. Balbo returned to Britain in each of the three succeeding years;
attending the Hendon air display in 1928 and the Schneider Trophy contest on the
Solent in 1929, and visiting London in 1929.
On his visits to Britain, did Balbo (or any of his companions) never once, either
in public or in private, refer to or quote Douhet - Italy’s honoured son and foremost
military theorist? In light of the great British interest in, and the very close ties
with, Italian aviation in the 20s, I (like Powers) find it “impossible” to believe that
Douhet’s ideas were not known in this country at that time.
What does it matter if Hoare did know of/was influenced by Douhet? It matters a
great deal. Hoare is a very important figure in the history of the RAF because, as his
biographer amply demonstrates, in the difficult and crucial years of the 20s Hoare’s
championship of the RAF was nothing less than decisive. Cross credits Hoare with
three major achievements at the Air Ministry: successfully maintaining the independence
and integrity of the RAF against fierce opposition; the considerable development
of military and civil aviation; and the creation of a public opinion sympathetic
to airpower. If, as has often been said, Trenchard was the Father of the RAF, then
Hoare could fairly be termed its favourite uncle.
I think it quite possible that Caproni had some influence on Trenchard’s thinking
on airpower during WWI. It is now generally accepted that Trenchard was essentially
an organiser; he was not in any real sense a theorist or polemicist. He had always
to rely on others. Initially, Trenchard was strongly opposed to the idea of independent
airpower and strategic bombing. His conversion only came about belatedly in the
last months of the war, when he was put in command of the RAF’s new Independent
Force and charged with the strategic bombing of Germany. Presumably, given that
his past experience had only involved the tactical use of airpower, he would have
been receptive to the advice and guidance of others, more experienced in the field of
strategic bombing than himself.
Given Baring’s intimate relationship with Trenchard, his two missions to Italy in
connection with Caproni bombers, his fluency in Italian, and the world-wide standing
of Italian aviation in general and Caproni in particular, it is almost inconceivable
that Trenchard was not aware of Caproni’s ideas.