National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

u.s. air fo r C e do C t r i n e:. tH e se a r C H f o r deCisive effeCt 345
developed theories of deterrence based on nuclear weapons. 30
Faced with the need to deter a Soviet enemy that could threaten America’s
European allies with overwhelming ground forces, the Americans found it cheaper
and simpler to deter the Soviets by a superior airpower force that could guarantee
massive nuclear destruction in the USSR in case of overt aggression. The nuclear
deterrence theories assumed that the Soviets were highly rational actors who would
carefully weigh the risk of openly attacking America or American allies and would
back away from overt confrontation. It was a theory and doctrine, if cruel and
ruthless in its implications, also worked to maintain peace and stability in Europe
for decades.
On the other hand, in the immediate postwar world the Americans paid little heed
to how airpower might respond to a war carried out by a proxy power for limited
aims in an area on the margin of American interests. Would America use nuclear
weapons if core interests and values were not at stake? Would the emphasis on the
strategic bomber force and lack of resources for its tactical air forces prove to be a
strategic mistake?
The Korean War initiated by the invasion of communist North Korea against a
Western-aligned South Korea in June 1950 provoked American and international
intervention to defend the South Koreans. American airpower based in Japan and
Pacific bases was the first American response to the North Korean attack. Although
the Americans and their allies had air superiority at the start of the war, the
overwhelming airpower advantage failed to stop the relentless North Korean advance
that carried the invader up to a small perimeter around Pusan. Finally, American and
UN reinforcements, backed up by a massive application of available airpower, finally
enabled the UN forces to hold the line. Aerial interdiction carried out in a manner no
different from World War II helped cripple North Korean logistics and demoralize
the communist ground forces, but airpower alone could not be decisive in this type
of war. It was only the American amphibious landing at Inchon that turned the tide
in Korea in 1950. 31
30 Brodie and Kahn were prolific and influential; authors. The key works on nuclear war theory by
Bernard Brodie are: Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New
York: Harcourt, 1946); Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959);
From Cross-Bow to H-Bomb (New York: Dell, 1962); Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966). Herman Kahn wrote several important books on nuclear
war theory to include: Thinking about the unthinkable (New York, Horizon Press, 1962); On thermonuclear
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). Kahn worked closely with the military
developing special studies as a member of the Rand corporation. Some of Kahn’s Rand studies
include Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense, 1958; and The Nature and Feasibility of War
and Deterrence, 1960.
31 An overview of the air war in Korea is found in Alan Stephens, “The Air War in Korea, 1950-1953”
in A History of Air Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2010) pp.
85-106.