National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

210 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
to almost 650 in 1918) - the materiel situation remained pressing.
The situation was alleviated to some extent by the “windfall” of over a hundred
aircraft of the various countries who were involved in the war being grounded on
Dutch territory due to emergency landings as a result of engine failure, battle damage,
fuel shortage or navigational errors. The Dutch military authorities promptly
interned the foreign pilots and confiscated their planes. The LVA transported the
aircraft on special trailers to Soesterberg Air Base, where they were checked by technical
personnel and, if possible, repaired. The almost seventy serviceable confiscated
aircraft formed a welcome addition to the Dutch air fleet. The LVA benefitted greatly
by these “uninvited guests”. Dutch technical personnel were thus able to acquaint
themselves with the most advanced equipment, including the latest developments in
the fields of radiotelegraphy and armament. They grew into all-round experts with
a wide knowledge of materiel. While it was true that the LVA pilots lacked combat
experience, they were nonetheless able to familiarise themselves with practically all
types of military aircraft available at the time. At the end of World War I, the pilots
maintained their flying skills in a motley collection of aircraft.
The post-war years brought international détente. The Covenant of the League
of Nations, concluded in 1920, contained provisions that virtually excluded another
war. Many national governments estimated that the chances of preserving peace
were high and therefore felt that drastic cuts in defence expenditure were justified.
The Dutch armed forces were set strict financial limits during the interwar period.
The same was true of the LVA, which had to make do with a decreasing budget in
the 1920s. The limited financial resources had a highly debilitating effect on the
development of the young air service, all the more so given the fact that technological
innovations in the air industry were the order of the day. The LVA was unable to
maintain a sizeable air fleet, for the simple reason that there was no money for large
procurement projects.
Dutch air defence was expected to be able to repel the first air attack by an aggressor
and that was as far as the military ambition went. To be able to continue fighting
the Dutch armed forces would need the support of allies. At the time, three main
tasks were identified for the air arm: to carry out reconnaissance flights, to eliminate
enemy aircraft and to carry out bombardments. The Dutch army leadership assigned
top priority to the reconnaissance task of the LVA, followed by the elimination of
enemy aircraft. The carrying out of bombardments, which was considered an offensive
task and therefore less suitable for the more defensively-oriented Dutch armed
forces, was given the lowest priority.
The LVA tried to maintain its striking power at an acceptable level by procuring
small series of modern aircraft on a regular basis. It placed its orders preferably
with Dutch aircraft manufacturers such as Anthony Fokker and, some time after
that, Frits Koolhoven. These manufacturers produced aircraft for both the civilian
and the military market. The LVA, in the period from 1920 to 1935 always ordered
with Fokker. This decision was partly motivated by employment considerations, but