National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
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74 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s<br />
The Air Campaign that did not Take Place<br />
The <strong>for</strong>mal decision to launch Operation Musketeer took place on 25 October<br />
1956. The decision to use <strong>for</strong>ce, had, however, been decided earlier – probably<br />
on 14 October when a high level French delegation paid a visit to Prime Minister<br />
Eden. Things began to happen rapidly after the visit. On 18 October the Air Ministry<br />
ordered execution of Operation Challenger, the re-deployment of Bomber Command<br />
squadrons to the Middle East (Malta and Cyprus). 69 On the next day, the French<br />
commenced the loading of transport vessels in Algiers and Marseille and the French<br />
fighter squadrons flew from Metropolitan France to Cyprus on 22 October. 70<br />
The Royal Air Force finished the deployment of its bomber squadrons to<br />
Malta and Cyprus by 30 October. 71 The first phase of air operations began on the<br />
evening of 31 October and continued <strong>for</strong> two days. The results of night bombing<br />
were ineffective. According to the report by the Operational Research Branch of<br />
the Bomber Command, there was a lot to improve especially in the high level night<br />
bombing techniques: “The bombing accuracy of the Valiant was about 1,000 yards,<br />
Malta Canberras 800 yards and the Cyprus Canberras 500 yards.” The low-lever<br />
attacks in daylight, however, annihilated the bulk of the Egyptian Air Force during<br />
the first two days as planned. 72<br />
The next phase of the plan was cancelled be<strong>for</strong>e it was put into a practice. The<br />
Egypt Committee decided against the destruction of the Egyptian oil installations<br />
because repercussions in other Arab countries could damage the United Kingdom’s<br />
own oil interests. 73 According to the instructions, the bombing campaign should<br />
concentrate only on military targets. 74<br />
The hectic timetable and the decision to abandon the destruction of the Egyptian<br />
oil installations dropped the bottom from the psychological operations. Not even<br />
Radio Cairo was silenced at the first phase of the operation despite General Keightley<br />
having placed this radio station on the list of targets that were to be attacked first. 75<br />
The attack took place only on 2 November, but a raid by twenty Canberra-bombers<br />
69<br />
AIR 20/10203 Air Ministry to Bomber Command, 2445/ACAS (ops)/TS/Oct 18 1956, “Operation<br />
Challenger”.<br />
70<br />
SHD 8 S 274, Etat-Major des Forces Armeés, 1618/EMFA/3. B.T.M.A/12 Avril 1957, “Les Transports<br />
de L’operation 700 » and Imperial War Museum, 96/10/1, papers of Air Chief Marshal Denis<br />
Barnett, Groupement Mixte No 1, 320/GM1/OPS/TS/27 Novembre 1956, “Rapport du General De<br />
Brigade Aerienne Brohon sur la Creation, L’ installation et L’activite du Groupment Mixte No 1 a<br />
Chypre”.<br />
71<br />
AIR 8/2090, A note by Wing Commander Hughes, 12 Nov 1956, “Deployment of Bomber Forces to<br />
the Middle East”.<br />
72<br />
NA AIR 14/4441, Bomber Command, Operational Research Branch, Report number 355: “Bombing<br />
and Ground Attack Operations during Operation Musketeer” and AIR 8/2111, Air Ministry, D.D.<br />
(Ops), TS 301/III, 17 February 1957, “Operation Musketeer”.<br />
73 th NA CAB 134/1216, EC (56) 37 Meeting, 1 November 1956.<br />
74<br />
NA AIR 8/1940, COSKEY 20, 2 November 1956.<br />
75<br />
Papers of General Sir Charles Keightley, Transcripts: rear link communications Episkopi-London.