National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

92 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
British air war doctrine, for, after all, the will of the people was given first priority
in a democracy. 14 However, the widespread understanding, which was in line with
the then applicable state of the art of aeronautical engineering, that modern, multiengine
bombers could not be intercepted by the initially much slower single-engine
fighter aircraft but by pure coincidence also played an important role. 15 This expectation
culminated in the well-known sentence uttered by British Prime Minister Stanly
Baldwin: „The bomber will always get through“. 16
Trenchard’s air war doctrine, on the one hand, was designed to punish the people
of an enemy nation by attacking their cities with bombers and, on the other hand, to
bomb them to their senses so that they forced their political leaders to stop hostilities.
The question as to whether this strategy would also work with non-democratic,
totalitarian states remained unanswered.
The air war strategy of the United States of America first took a completely different
turn. 17 During World War I, their small army aviation branch did not enter
the war in Europe until very late, supporting friendly ground forces during its few
sorties. This might have contributed to the fact that, in the US Army, only General
William Mitchell thought that the air war would play a decisive role in a future war.
In his book published in 1925 he stated: “The influence of air power on the ability
of one nation to impress its will on an other in an armed conflict will be decisive”. 18
Mitchell therefore did not demand an augmentation of the fighter aviation branch,
which would have been hard to justify due to the geostrategic position of the USA.
Instead, he advocated a strategic bomb war on enemy territory. Like Douhet and
Trenchard, Mitchell also assumed that the aerial destruction of vital centers in the
enemy’s hinterland would break the enemy’s will of resistance faster than army operations
on the ground would do.
With his theses, the General set against him the rivaling Services of Army, Navy
and Marine Corps in the USA, which were fighting hard for both their share in the
national budget and their status. His strategic approach to an air war did not meet
with great response in the USA since, at the same time, he also questioned their
operational principles and efficiency. Rather, he had to stand trial for his theses in a
military court and was forced to leave the US Army. Mitchell’s strategic ideas were
not completely lost, but until long into World War II the American attitude towards
air war was characterized by the view that aircraft only had to provide combat sup-
14
Cf. Boog, Der anglo-amerikanische strategische Luftkrieg (see Note 9), p. 433.
15
Cf. Irving B. Holley Jr., Die Entwicklung der Abwehrbewaffnung für die Bomber der US-Heeresstreitkräfte
in den Jahren 1918 bis 1941. Eine Studie über Produktionserfolge trotz Mängeln in der
Doktrin, in: Boog, Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (see Note 3), p. 166.
16
Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and the Two World Wars. London 1979, p. 59.
17
Cf. Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: the Evolution of British and American
Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945. Princeton 2002.
18
William Mitchell, Winged Defense. The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power -Economic
and Military. New York 1925, p. 214.