National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
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th e AIr Ar m d u r I n g t h e le b A n o n wA r 1982 173<br />
As already mentioned, in parallel to air combat the attack continued on the surface-to-air<br />
missiles with very good results. I could follow this by reading the Syrian<br />
side and from intelligence reports. I was also briefed by the command cell. Along<br />
this time, Chief of Staff Eitan sat as a scout in the command cell next to me. I glanced<br />
at him from time to time and saw how much he was impressed and, happy to hear the<br />
reports about Syrian aircraft being downed. He was full of admiration.<br />
Aviem Sela came up to our floor and whispered to me that 13 batteries were totally<br />
destroyed, each received a double verification, and the remaining 6 are paralyzed<br />
with one verification of destruction each. According to intelligence, there is no life in<br />
the <strong>for</strong>mation, meaning there is no electromagnetic radiation of radar, so the surfaceto-air<br />
missiles were in fact destroyed. We still have armed aircraft patrolling ready to<br />
attack because we wanted to verify “the mother of destruction”. The understanding<br />
between me and Sela developed amazingly in the last year, so even be<strong>for</strong>e he spoke<br />
I understood that he thought there was no point to continue and endanger more airplanes.<br />
I immediately instructed to stop the attack and divert all aircraft to assist our<br />
land <strong>for</strong>ces in Lebanon’s other fronts. Till this day, Sela reminds me that I instructed<br />
to stop the attack without consulting with the Chief of Staff, but I sensed that we are<br />
close to a dangerous situation that could lead to a mistake and risk shooting down our<br />
own aircraft. On the other hand, we destroyed the surface-to-air missiles and downed<br />
26 aircraft without losing a single aircraft, so it would be better to end the attack at<br />
this point, a fast and right decision without any time to consult because each second<br />
could be critical <strong>for</strong> one of the airplanes.<br />
The decision involved the fact that some of the airplanes in the waiting circle<br />
did not have targets, and they were <strong>for</strong>ced to dump their loads into the sea in order<br />
to avoid landing fully loaded. They were very frustrated to have missed out on the<br />
celebration of surrounding and destroying the surface-to-air missiles. During the first<br />
evening, I could still hear criticizing remarks about stopping the attack, a decision<br />
that was later understood and received full backing from all levels of command and<br />
operation.<br />
The attack on the surface-to-air missiles was planned with high factors in order<br />
to assure destruction. Each battery required two verifications <strong>for</strong> destruction in order<br />
to prevent a situation in which smoke or different angles could mislead us, finding<br />
ourselves with a partly destroyed <strong>for</strong>mation.<br />
In all fields of activity, in EW, we doubled the power and number of jammings.<br />
The amount of chaff dispersed was double than required by operations research. This<br />
helped us create a friendly environment <strong>for</strong> our aircraft, and almost total blindness<br />
to the Syrian air defense. We wanted to pass this test after the trauma of Yom Kippur<br />
with the highest score.<br />
We deliberately published the success of the Hawk Eye E2C aircraft as a cover<br />
story <strong>for</strong> other air activity we per<strong>for</strong>med. The publication was absorbed and some<br />
countries considered it to be the main reason <strong>for</strong> the success of the operation in