National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

th e AIr Ar m d u r I n g t h e le b A n o n wA r 1982 171
to bring it before the government for approval. It was agreed that the minister would
present it to the government on Wednesday morning, while assessing that an approval
will be obtained by 10:00, and an attack could be planned for 12:00.
Chief of Staff Eitan decided to stay at the northern command for the night, and
drive to Tel Aviv the following morning to join us at the IAF command post, from
where we planned to conduct the fighting, and complete the preparations and briefings
towards the attack.
Minister Sharon wanted someone who is familiar with the plans to attend the government
meeting with him, in order to answer any professional questions that may
rise. It was decided that B/G Amos Amir, who left his position as head of air division,
was now free of any role, would join the minister as an expert.
The government meeting on Wednesday was lengthy. We kept in contact with
Amos Amir and understood that a decision would not be made till 10:00, so I instructed
the IAF to postpone the time starting the attack to 14:00 in order to operate
without pressure. The government indeed gave its decision after 11:00, meaning that
we had more than 2 hours for all the required actions.
After receiving the approval, there was a sense of alert and tension in the command
post. The command echelon felt as if it were just before a matriculation exam.
The material was learned and exercised for years, but the test page is yet to be revealed.
There was concern about unexpected questions.
Personally, I began a series of phone calls with wing and base commanders, and
C2I units, in order to make sure that everyone was aware of the approval and get
feedback on their preparedness. I sensed that the IAF was alert and ready. This reminded
me of the time before take off during “Moked” operation in the Six Day
War. The crews know their goals, the “band’ knows how to play in synchronism after
many drills. The instruments are tuned and waiting for the conductor to give the note.
In this case, it was the hands of many clocks showing 14:00. The clocks were reset
at all levels of control, command, and operation.
The command cell, where we were prepared to control the special operation
against the missile defense, was located in the new IAF command post, one floor
under the main command center where I sat. All command cells face the control desk
that gives a current air status picture. The desk and mission boards on top of it give
one common language for all command cells.
The command cell for the attack on the surface-to-air missiles exercised many
times in simulation with and without airborne power. We had a skilled team headed
by Sela and Itzik Ben Israel, whom I knew and could count on them while I, myself,
had to focus on the interception of Syrian fighter planes that could be launched to
protect to SAM batteries, but also threaten our forces. This is where things can take
an unexpected turn and require an immediate response. Experience in command is
very significant here. In fact, I had to prevent Syrian air force from interfering with
the attack on the surface-to-air missiles, so that the attack will take place without