National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

tH e pl a C e o f do u H e t: a reassessment 119
It is a fact that there were a great many similarities in what the three great interwar
proponents of air power - Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell - believed and advocated
(there were also some differences of course). This was no doubt partly due to their
ideas being the natural products of like stimuli. As Higham says, men subjected
to similar influences sometimes arrive at similar conclusions, without necessarily
being aware of each other’s ideas. But there was as well, undeniably, considerable
cross-fertilisation, as Brodie says. For, it is clear that, from the earliest days, airmen
constituted a close international community; the French, Italian, American and British
members of which were brought even closer together by WWI. And even in the
earliest days of aviation, there were opportunities for airmen from different countries
to meet each other and to exchange information and ideas; as regards British, French,
Italian and US aviation, such opportunities were naturally very much greater during
the war.
As Boone Atkinson has written, military men are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge
debts - least of all to a country which had suffered the debacle of Caporetto.
There was, it is clear, a conscious downplaying of Caproni’s influence on US airmen
after the fact. No doubt national pride played a large part in this; as did professional
pride (Caproni being a civilian). But, of course, unlike the Americans, the British had
had considerable experience of strategic bombing during WWI - both as practitioners
and as victims. As a consequence, the British were undoubtedly less receptive to
outside influences than the Americans. Nevertheless, the evidence presented above
strongly suggests, in my judgement, that British airmen were not only interested in
and informed about, but also influenced by, Italian aviation and aviation developments
in Italy - directly challenging the prevailing view. I do not of course seek
to deny the deep native roots of British air power theory - HG Wells, Sykes, Lord
Montagu, Lanchester, Sueter, Spaight “et al”. But I certainly do not think that it is
unreasonable to argue that British airpower theory could have been a compound of
indigenous factors and outside influences.
I am not claiming that knowledge of (still less, interest in) the ideas of Douhet
permeated all levels of the RAF: in all organisations there is a division between
those who make and those who implement policy and their agendas can be very
different. I do claim however that certain individuals, occupying positions of power
or influence, were certainly aware of - and probably influenced by - Douhet. Knowledge
and influence are of course different things. Knowledge, although an essential
prerequisite for influence, does not automatically lead to influence. I readily admit
that to date more hard evidence of knowledge has been accumulated than of influence.
The evidence of influence is in truth largely circumstantial. However, I find the
evidence of influence, albeit largely circumstantial, persuasive. It is hard to accept
that the RAF’s awareness of Douhet’s ideas - as demonstrated in this piece - and the
RAF’s passionate belief in strategic bombing between the wars were completely
unconnected.
Those who will no doubt retort (quite rightly) that over the years the RAF has in