National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

124 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s
NCOs. Ground personnel consisted of 65 persons with other specialties.
Naval Air Command was assigned with open sea patrols, anti–submarine patrols
and mine searching missions. This Command on the eve of the war was consisted of
the following three squadrons:
No. 11 (Naval Co-op) Squadron was equipped with 9 Fairey III Fs and was based
at Valtoudi, Magnesia. It possessed 8 pilots (officers and NCOs) while ground personnel
consisted of 150-180 persons with other specialties.
No. 12 (Naval Co-op) Squadron was operating from Suda Air Base in Crete as
well as from Milos, Moudros and Mytilene. Its inventory consisted of 12 Dornier Do
22Kg seaplanes. It included 15 pilots and 220 ground personnel (Figure 3).
No. 13 (Naval Co-op) Squadron was stationed at Eleusis Air Base, having at its
disposal 9 Avro 652A Anson Mk I. The flying personnel included 23 officers and 16
NCOs supported by 200 persons with other specialties.
The RHAF also used, for training purposes, 6 Hawker Horsley II bombers, 6 Avia
B-534 (verze III) fighter /trainers, 2 Gloster Gladiator fighters, 20 Avro 621, 22 Avro
626 Prefect and a number of Morane- Saulnier MS.230 trainers. The Breguet 19s
and Potez Po 25s, were withdrawn from active service soon after the hostilities broke
out while the Dornier Do 22Kg were sent to the State Aircraft Factory in order to be
converted into front line combat aircraft.
On the eve of the Hellenic-Italian War, the total potential of RHAF front-line aircraft
was 78 aircraft (24 P.Z.L P.24s, 9Bloch MB.151s, 8 Potez 633 B2s, 11 Bristol
Blenheim Mk IVs, 10 Fairey Battle B.1s and 16 Henschel Hs 126s). On the other
hand, the Regia Aeronautica had 225 bombers, 179 fighters and 59 reconnaissance
aircraft for this campaign, summing up in a total of 463. Furthermore, RHAF aircraft
were by far less capable in comparison with those of the Regia Aeronautica as far as
their overall specifications and performance were concerned 3 .
Regarding the RHAF aerodromes, they had severe deficiencies in terms of antiaircraft
protection, wireless communications and runway conditions. Most of these
airfields were covered in clover and would become soggy and nonoperational in
wet weather. The Regia Aeronautica on the other hand could use a large number of
airfields all along the front. As a result, the Italian aircraft could penetrate deep into
the Hellenic territory even under adverse weather conditions. The RHAF, in view
of these deficiencies, had to rely to a very large degree on the abilities and courage
of its pilots. However, The RHAF, as a small airforce with scanty supply of modern
aircraft, entered the war with high morale.
3 Hellenic Wings, Ibid, pp. 90-91.