National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
National Experiences - British Commission for Military History
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168 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s<br />
to take part in containing the ground invasions from day one, so the operation plans<br />
did not come to a test.<br />
Despite the fact that the achievements at the end of the war were impressive, the<br />
IAF felt bad. This feeling was expressed by <strong>for</strong>mer IAF Commander Ezer Weizmann,<br />
later minister of defense and President of Israel: “The missile bent the wing of the<br />
fighter plane”.<br />
This resulted in a certain grinding in the strong status of the IAF, which had an<br />
impact on the distribution of budget and preference in allocation of manpower; i.e.,<br />
the ground <strong>for</strong>ces were considerably favored.<br />
In October 1977, I took the position of IAF Commander and replaced M/G Benny<br />
Peled – a charismatic commander who began a revolution, in the organizational<br />
structure and a more technological approach to answer operational problems.<br />
In November 1977, President Sadat arrived in Israel <strong>for</strong> a visit to Jerusalem, the<br />
beginning of a process of strategic importance that led to the signing of a peace treaty<br />
and retreat from Sinai in March 1979.<br />
Nevertheless, war against hostile activity continued in the north. In March 1978<br />
we find ourselves in the midst of the Litani operation, a military operation that tried<br />
to push back terrorist presence from the border deep into Lebanon, following the<br />
killing of civilians by terrorists who penetrated from Lebanon.<br />
After the Litani operation in March 1977, UNIFIL entered south Lebanon, but<br />
they did not prevent the terrorists from moving south and harassing the northern settlements.<br />
So we had to operate almost daily from the air against terrorist targets in<br />
south Lebanon. At the beginning interception aircraft were sent from Syria (MiG 21<br />
and MiG 23) in order to disturb our air activity; however, after a few encounters –<br />
many of them planned by us – they suffered accumulating losses in air combat, and<br />
usually remain to patrol in Syria without penetrating Lebanon. One could say that<br />
towards the Lebanon War of 1982 we achieved full freedom of air power in Lebanon,<br />
which was very significant to the IAF pilots’ esteem and air control.<br />
The Syrians, who understood that they are not a match to the IAF in air combat,<br />
transferred three SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 surface to air missile divisions to the Lebanon<br />
Beka’a <strong>for</strong> protection against the IAF. This narrowed somewhat the air freedom of<br />
power on the Lebanese eastern side, thus reaching 1982.<br />
Attack on the surface-to-air missiles in the Beka’a in june 1982<br />
On Wednesday, 9 June 1982, at 14:00, the attack on the surface-to-air missiles<br />
during the Lebanon war began. This chapter deals with one of the greatest successes<br />
in air warfare, in which the dense surface-to-air missile defense was destructed –<br />
SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 missiles that were deployed in the Lebanon Beka’a valley and<br />
along Lebanon’s eastern border.<br />
The surface-to-air missile defense was a Soviet war doctrine, with a seperate